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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation is to study the competition of biofuels to meet the U.S. renewable fuels 
standards (RFS) and its impact on biofuel and corn prices, and the impacts of weather and soil 
moisture on corn yield in the Midwest. Chapter 2 illustrates the hierarchical competition of U.S. 
corn ethanol, Brazilian sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel to meet the RFS mandates and explained 
the evidenced two-way trade of ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil using a computable trade 
model of ethanol related markets between the U.S. and Brazil. And we estimate the impact of 
RFS on biofuel prices, agricultural commodity prices using a stochastic partial equilibrium 
model. Chapter 3 develops a linear spline fixed effect model to estimate the impact of climate 
variables on corn yield by adding in soil moisture as an explanatory variable. Recent two drought 
years 2011 and 2012 are included that facilitates estimation of corn yield response to extreme 
conditions. Daily soil moisture data in the Upper Mississippi River Basin Area from 1980 to 
2012 is simulated from the crop model EPIC, which has very comprehensive interactions 
between hydrology, weather, soil, crop and plant environment controls. Bayesian Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo approach is applied to estimate the parameters and the thresholds simultaneously. 
Including recent two drought years 2011 and 2012 to have more drought observations in the 
modern eras, Chapter 4 revisits previous literature using the our extended data and then 
constructs yield response functions allowing the yield deviation from weather variables to 
change over time. Null hypotheses that the marginal and total weather impacts of adverse 
weather conditions remain constant are then tested. 
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CHAPTER 1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States and Brazil are the two largest ethanol producers, accounting for 
more than 85% of the world’s ethanol production, with the principal feedstock being corn in 
the U.S. and sugarcane in Brazil. The biofuels market in the U.S. and Brazil depends on 
government policies, the world gasoline price and feedstock prices and the demand of 
blended gasoline. It is imperative to develop a comprehensive model incorporating all 
interrelated biofuel market, feedstock markets and trade between the U.S. and Brazil to help 
understand the economic impacts of Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). 
The RFS established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and considerably expanded in 
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 mandates minimum volumes of specific 
renewable fuels use in the U.S., which is a primary source of the expansion of the biofuel 
market. RFS establishes a three-level mandate hierarchy for renewable fuels based on the 
minimum lifecycle greenhouse gases emissions reduction of renewable fuels pathways: 
overall mandate as the broadest level; advanced biofuels mandate at the second level, which 
counting towards overall mandate, can be met by biomass-based diesel (biodiesel), cellulosic 
biofuels, and Brazilian sugarcane ethanol; within the advanced mandate, there existing the 
biodiesel and cellulosic biofuels sub-mandates at the narrowest level. EPA developed the 
Renewable Identification Number (RIN) market to facilitate compliance with the RFS. The 
hierarchy structure of the RFS mandates induce competition between sugarcane ethanol and 
biodiesel to meet the U.S. advanced mandate and the competition between corn ethanol and 
sugarcane ethanol to meet the U.S. conventional mandate. This also raises many important 
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questions: Which and how much of corn ethanol, sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel will be 
used to meet the RFS mandates? How much sugarcane ethanol is required to meet the 
advanced mandate? How are the biofuel RINs priced? What is the impact of RFS on the 
market of corn, ethanol and gasoline markets? 
Chapter 2 "Competition of Biofuels to Meet the RFS Mandates" presents a 
computable trade model of ethanol related markets between the U.S. and Brazil. Equilibrium 
conditions are specified under scenarios: with all RFS mandates, with conventional mandate 
only and with no mandates. Through the model, we illustrate the evidenced two-way trade of 
ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil induced by biofuel mandates. The supply curves of 
conventional biofuels RINs and advanced biofuels RINs are constructed, which can be used 
to illustrate and simulate the hierarchical competition of U.S. corn ethanol, Brazilian 
sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel, and to project all biofuels RINs prices. Moreover, we 
calibrate the demand and supply curves of corn, soybean, and biofuels, and simulate the 
equilibrium prices and quantities for marketing year 2013/14, using a stochastic partial 
equilibrium model. The model is applied to four scenarios: with all RFS mandates, with 
conventional mandate only, with RFS advanced mandate restricted to be met by sugarcane 
ethanol and with no mandates. Results indicate that RFS mandates induce the two-way trade 
of ethanol across the U.S. and Brazil and the possibility of two-way trade would increase 
with the other advanced mandate. Biodiesel helps reduce this potentially trade, but could not 
eliminate this whole impact on trade without subsidies.  
Due to the expansion of renewable fuel industry, agriculture and energy are closely 
correlated with each other. In the U.S., corn is the primary feedstock used to produce ethanol 
so that corn supply is critical to determine the biofuel production and energy policy 
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effectiveness. Due to the drought weather condition in 2012, corn yields were projected to be 
123.4 bushels per acre in 2012 by U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which decreased 
by 16% comparing with previous year. Together with the sharp decrease in corn production, 
corn price increased by 68 cents (11%). And this shortage in corn production also brought 
concerns on the whole agriculture and biofuel industries. In the first essay, we assumed that 
corn yields are stochastic following the historical distribution. The second essay focuses on 
investigating the impact of adverse weather conditions on corn yield in the Midwest. Not 
limited to the two frequently used weather variables in existing literature, temperature and 
rainfall, we add soil moisture as an explanatory variable into the corn yield response 
function. Daily soil moisture data in the Upper Mississippi River Basin Area (UMRB) from 
1980 to 2012 is simulated from the crop model Environmental Policy Integrated Climate 
(EPIC), which has very comprehensive interactions between hydrology, weather, soil, 
nutrients, crop and plant environment controls. Recent two drought years 2011 and 2012 are 
included in the estimation dataset to facilitate estimation of corn yield response to extreme 
conditions. 
Chapter 3 "Impact of Weather and Soil Moisture on Corn Yield in the US Midwest" 
develops a linear spline fixed effect model to estimate the impact of climate and soil 
variables on corn yield. Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach is applied to estimate 
the parameters and the thresholds simultaneously. Results suggest corn yield effects from 
high temperature and plant water availability cannot be meaning fully isolated from one 
another. The percent yield reduction from high temperature is 15 to 20 percentage points 
greater under low compared to high water availability. The determinant factors for corn yield 
losses vary across the Corn Belt region. Excessive spring rainfall is damaging to corn yield in 
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Illinois and Iowa, however, during hot and dry summers, excessive spring rainfall is 
important for reducing yield loss through the soil moisture effect. In Wisconsin, too little 
spring rainfall is more damaging than too much. 
In existing literatures, weather impacts on corn yield have been well studied and the 
results are very consistent. But there are still a lot of debates on whether corn is becoming 
more drought tolerant over time. Yu and Babcock (2010) examines how drought tolerance of 
corn and soybeans changed over time in the U.S. using a constructed drought index. Their 
results indicate that corn yield losses from a drought of a given severity have decreased over 
time in both absolute and percentage terms. However, very few drought incidents after 1990 
comparing with the 1980s make their conclusions less convincing. Moreover, using field data 
on maize and soybean in the central U.S. for 1995-2012, Lobell, et al. (2014) concludes that 
drought sensitivity in maize, in particular sensitivity to high vapor pressure deficits (VPD), 
has steadily increased over the period from 1995-2012. Chapter 4 revisits Yu and Babcock 
(2010) using the dataset developed in Chapter 3 with more drought incidents in the modern 
era and simulated soil moisture. We construct models to allow the weather impact to change 
over time and test the hypotheses that the impacts remain constant over time under our 
hypothetical adverse weather conditions. Our results show that yield losses due to drought 
conditions increases over time in absolute yield terms but remains constant in percentage 
terms due to increase in base yield over time. Corn yield is becoming less sensitive to July-
August precipitation which reduces yield losses under modest drought level.  
Finally in Chapter 5, a summary of general conclusions is presented. 
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CHAPTER 2.   COMPETITION OF BIOFUELS TO MEET RFS MANDATES 
 
Abstract 
This paper constructs a computable trade model of ethanol related markets between 
the U.S. and Brazil. Equilibrium conditions are specified under RFS biofuels mandates. 
Through the model, we illustrated the evidenced two-way trade of ethanol between the U.S. 
and Brazil. The supply curves of conventional biofuels RINs and advanced biofuels RINs are 
constructed, which can be used to demonstrate and simulate the hierarchical competition of 
U.S. corn ethanol, Brazilian sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel, and to project all biofuels RINs 
prices. Moreover, we calibrated the demand and supply curves of corn, soybean, and 
biofuels, and simulated equilibrium prices and quantities for marketing year 2013/14, using a 
stochastic quantitative model. The average values are used to estimate the impacts of RFS 
mandates on U.S. biofuels market. Our results showed that RFS mandates induced the two-
way trade of ethanol across the U.S. and Brazil and the possibility of two-way trade would 
increase with the other advanced mandate. Competition from Biodiesel to meet the advanced 
mandate helped reduce this potentially two-way trade, but could not eliminate this whole 
impact on trade without subsidies. 
Introduction 
Concerns about growing dependency on foreign oil supplies, and greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) emissions have motivated the development of biofuels, such as the ethanol and 
biomass-based diesel, as substitutes of gasoline. The United States and Brazil are the two 
largest ethanol producers, accounting for more than 85% of the world’s ethanol production, 
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with the principal feedstock being corn in the U.S. and sugarcane in Brazil. U.S. ethanol 
production has increased rapidly from1.63 billion gallons (BG) in 2000 to 13.9 BG in 2011. 
The U.S. surpassed Brazil as the largest producer of ethanol in 2006. 
The U.S. had been an importer of ethanol since 2004, almost all from Brazil, directly 
or through Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries. Starting from 2010 till present, it 
began to export corn ethanol, a large portion to Brazil. Meanwhile, the U.S. still keeps 
importing ethanol from Brazil. Ethanol exports even exceeded ethanol imports in 2011 
(Figure 2.1).  The major driver for this two way trade is the U.S. biofuel mandates. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Trade of ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil 
Data Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 
 
U.S. ethanol subsidy programs as volumetric ethanol excise tax credit
1
 and ethanol 
tariff
2
 expired in the end of 2011. These policies promoted the development of the ethanol 
                                                 
1
 Volumetric ethanol excise tax credit program is that gasoline suppliers who blend ethanol with gasoline are 
eligible for a tax credit of 45 cents per gallon of ethanol (Congressional Research Service 2012). 
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industry. But they didn’t help differentiate U.S. corn ethanol and Brazilian sugarcane ethanol. 
Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 mandated 
minimum volumes of specific renewable fuels use in the U.S., which was considerably 
expanded and increased by the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS2) of the Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 2007. RFS establishes a three-level mandate hierarchy for renewable 
fuels based on the minimum lifecycle GHG emissions reduction of renewable fuels 
pathways
3
: overall mandate as the broadest level; advanced biofuels mandate at the second 
level, which counting towards overall mandate can be met by biomass-based diesel 
(biodiesel), cellulosic biofuels, and Brazilian sugarcane ethanol; within the advanced 
mandate, there existing the biodiesel and cellulosic biofuels sub-mandates at the narrowest 
level. The rest of the advanced mandate is named as the other advanced mandate (Thompson 
et al. 2010). Excluding the advanced mandate, the rest of the overall mandate is conventional 
mandate. This setting differentiates U.S. corn ethanol and Brazilian sugarcane ethanol in the 
way that corn ethanol can only be used to meet the overall mandate, while sugarcane ethanol 
also meets the criteria of advanced mandate.  
We construct a stylized trade model between the U.S. and Brazil taking into account 
of U.S. corn and soybean markets, U.S. ethanol and biodiesel market, Soybean meal and oil 
markets and Brazilian sugarcane ethanol market, and apply the RFS mandates on the U.S. 
ethanol market. We specify the equilibrium conditions, through which the equilibrium prices 
and quantities can be calculated.  
                                                                                                                                                       
2
 All imported ethanol is subject to a 2.5% ad valorem tariff; fuel ethanol is also subject to a most-favored-
nation added duty of 54 cents per gallon (with some exceptions) (Congressional Research Service 2012). 
3
 According to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the lifecycle GHG emissions reduction threshold 
for renewable fuel is 20%, 50% for advanced biofuels, 50% for biomass-based diesel, and 60% for cellulosic 
biofuel (Congressional Research Service 2013). 
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Moreover, we investigate how RFS mandates are implemented through Renewable 
Identification Numbers (RINs) and the determinations of RIN prices of various biofuels. 
Starting from a hypothetic case that there is no advanced mandate in place, we explore the 
supply of advanced RINs from sugarcane ethanol. This analysis allows us to get insights of 
the different RIN prices from the trade pattern of ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil and the 
state whether mandates are binding or not. We then extend the model to consider biodiesel as 
an alternative to meet the other advanced mandate, and discuss the possibility to use both 
biodiesel and sugarcane ethanol to meet the other advanced mandate. This competence from 
biodiesel might help reduce U.S. dependence on imported sugarcane ethanol from Brazil to 
meet the other advanced mandate. 
Specifically, following Babcock et al. (2010), with stochastic gasoline prices and 
feedstock yields, we calibrate the biofuels markets to solve for market clearing prices and 
quantities. The average values are used to estimate the impacts of RFS on U.S. biofuels 
market in the situation of marketing year
4
2013/14. We also explore the sensitivity of our 
results to U.S. gasoline price, Brazil ethanol production and U.S. corn yield levels. 
This paper provides insight into how the RFS mandates induce the two-way trade 
between the U.S. and Brazil and how the RFS mandates affect the biofuels and related 
commodities markets through RINs. Moreover, this study constructs demand and supply 
curves of RIN to help understand how the RIN market works. Our result also shows U.S. 
biodiesel could help meet the other advanced mandate to some extent, but currently still 
could not eliminate U.S. dependence on imported sugarcane ethanol to meet the RFS 
mandates.  
                                                 
4
 Marketing year for corn and soybean starts from September 1
st
. 
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The Model 
In this section, we establish a simple trade model to show the possibility of two-way 
trade in ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil. With concerns that the U.S. and Brazil 
accounting for over 85% of the world’s ethanol production, U.S. imports of ethanol almost 
all from Brazil, directly or through CBI countries, and Brazil ethanol imports mostly from the 
U.S., we only include the U.S. and Brazil in the ethanol industry in our model. In the U.S., 
ethanol is mainly produced from corn, while Brazil uses sugarcane as the feedstock for 
ethanol. We have three commodities: a numeraire composite good, corn as food or feeds, and 
fuels including gasoline, U.S. produced corn ethanol and Brazil produced sugarcane ethanol. 
Corn ethanol and sugarcane ethanol have the same energy content. They are perfect 
substitutes as fuels. 
Assume a representative consumer has a quasi-linear preference with utility function: 
𝑈 = 𝐷0 + 𝑓(𝐷𝑐) + 𝑔(𝐷𝑔 + 𝜃𝐷𝑒) (2.1) 
D0, Dc, Dg and De represent consumption of numeraire, corn, gasoline and ethanol
5
, 
respectively. f(·) and g(·) are increasing concave functions, while θ includes the factor that 
converts ethanol to gasoline energy equivalent amount
6, also reﬂects the constraints on blend 
rate of ethanol into gasoline
7
. As consumers cannot differentiate corn ethanol and sugarcane 
ethanol, the less expensive ethanol would be used to blend with gasoline. Maximizing the 
utility function, we could get the demand function of corn, gasoline and ethanol. The 
                                                 
5
 When ethanol is not specified as corn or sugarcane ethanol, it represents general ethanol and includes both. 
6
 The energy content of ethanol is about 2/3 of gasoline, according to National Renewable Energy Laboratory 
(2008).  
7
 In the U.S., conventional vehicles can only use gasoline blended with up to 10% of ethanol (E10). Small 
amounts of flex-fuel cars use fuels more than 10% and capped at 85% (E85). Another restriction hampering 
sales of E85 flex vehicles and E85 is the limited infrastructure available to sell E85 to the public. According to 
Renewable Fuels Association (RFA), as of mid-2012, there were only about 2904 E85 retail stations in the 
U.S., with a great concentration in the Corn Belt states, away from major fuels consumption states, also 
limited to the major Flex-fuel vehicle population (on the coasts). 
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demand of ethanol depends on the price ratio of ethanol to gasoline. Denote the prices facing 
consumers as pc for corn, pg for gasoline and pe
D
 for ethanol. 
The major elements of our model are as followings: 
1. U.S. demand for corn as food/feed, Dc(pc) 
2. U.S. corn supply, Sc(pc) 
3. U.S. demand for ethanol, De(pe
D
, pg) 
4. U.S. corn ethanol supply, Se(pe) 
5. U.S. demand for gasoline, Dg(pe
D
, pg) 
6. Brazilian demand for ethanol, De
BR
(pe
BR
) 
7. Brazilian sugarcane ethanol supply, Se
BR
(pe
BR
) 
pe denotes the ethanol supply price.
8
 Corn supply equals the corn production plus the corn 
stocks. U.S. corn utilization includes domestic food and feed use, use for stocks, net export, 
and use for ethanol. In the U.S., ethanol is mainly produced from corn. We assume a constant 
return to scale production process following Cui et al. (2011).  
𝑥𝑐𝑒 = min⁡{𝛼𝑥𝑐 , 𝑖𝑒} (2.2) 
where xce represents corn ethanol output in gallons, xc is corn feedstock input in bushels, ie is 
the amount of other inputs or costs used in the production process, α is the number of gallons 
of ethanol produced from one bushel of corn. 
Equilibrium 
As U.S. ethanol excise tax credit and ethanol tariff expired in the end of 2011, we 
assume that the only policy instrument is the RFS mandates on ethanol. In order to 
                                                 
8
 Because we need to differentiate the ethanol demand and supply price when we consider the biofuels 
mandates, we use different notation from the beginning. But when there are no government interventions, the 
demand ethanol price just equal to the ethanol supply price at equilibrium. 
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emphasize the trade in ethanol, we set the gasoline price as exogenous, and make it stochastic 
in the calibration.
9
 Also, we assume that corn ethanol is only produced in the U.S., sugarcane 
ethanol only in Brazil, and their trade of ethanol with other countries is set to be exogenous.
10
 
We assume that the transportation cost for the trade of ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil is 
positive, denoted as c. 
First, we specify the market equilibrium conditions with no policy instrument: 
𝑆𝑐(𝑝𝑐) = 𝐷𝑐(𝑝𝑐) + 𝐷𝑐
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟(𝑝𝑐) + 𝛼 ∙ 𝑆𝑒(𝑝𝑒) U.S. corn market equilibrium (2.3) 
𝑆𝑒(𝑝𝑒) + 𝐼𝑒 − 𝑋𝑒 = 𝐷𝑒(𝑝𝑒
𝐷 , 𝑝𝑔) U.S. ethanol market equilibrium (2.4) 
𝑆𝑒
𝐵𝑅(𝑝𝑒
𝐵𝑅) − 𝐼𝑒 + 𝑋𝑒 = 𝐷𝑒
𝐵𝑅(𝑝𝑒
𝐵𝑅) Brazilian ethanol market equilibrium (2.5) 
𝑝𝑒 =
𝑝𝑐
𝛾
+ 𝑐𝑒 
Zero profit condition in ethanol 
industry 
(2.6) 
where Dc
other
(pc) in equation (2.3) denotes corn demand for stock and net exports, and ce in 
equation (2.6) is the cost of other inputs per unit of corn ethanol produced. Considering the 
valuable byproducts in the ethanol production process, dried distiller grains with solubles 
(DDGS) which is correlated with the corn price, we adjust the parameter α and denote as γ. 
The arbitrage relationships in ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil are as follows: 
|𝑝𝑒 − 𝑝𝑒
𝐵𝑅| < 𝑐 No trade in ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil  
𝑝𝑒 = 𝑝𝑒
𝐵𝑅 + 𝑐 The U.S. imports sugarcane ethanol from Brazil (2.7) 
𝑝𝑒 = 𝑝𝑒
𝐵𝑅 − 𝑐 The U.S. exports corn ethanol to Brazil  
                                                 
9
  To make the gasoline price endogenous, we would also need to specify U.S. domestic production and imports 
of crude oil, and the oil refining section to make the model complete. 
10
 We omit the amount of their trade of ethanol with other countries in the specification of the model 
equilibrium. They are set to be constant and adjusted to the corresponding demand in our model calibration. 
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When no government interventions present, specifically no policies differentiating 
corn ethanol and sugarcane ethanol
11
, ethanol demand price equals to ethanol supply price, 
and there would be no trade between the U.S. and Brazil, or one way trade with U.S. either 
importing sugarcane ethanol from Brazil or exporting corn ethanol to Brazil. Whether any 
trade would happen and in which direction depends on the demand and supply parameters of 
the U.S. and Brazil. This result is consistent with the fact that the U.S. has been an importer 
of sugarcane ethanol before the implementation of the RFS in 2009.  
Combining equations (2.3) to (2.7), we can solve for the equilibrium prices (pc, pe, 
pe
BR
) and the equilibrium ethanol consumption, imports and exports. 
Equilibrium with RFS Mandates 
We now bring in U.S. RFS mandates into the model. First, we introduce the nested 
structure of these renewable fuels mandates. RFS was established in the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 and expanded in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. It places mandates 
on the consumptions of different renewable fuels based on their minimum lifecycle GHG 
emissions reduction level. It has an overall mandate on all renewable fuels, which include 
conventional fuels (corn ethanol) and advanced fuels. Within this overall mandate, there is a 
sub-mandate on the consumption of advanced fuels (cellulosic biofuels, biodiesel, and other 
advanced fuels). Furthermore, RFS also requires minimum quantities of cellulosic biofuels 
and biodiesel uses individually. Taking into account of the mandates on cellulosic biofuels 
and biodiesel, there is a residue of the advanced mandate (other advanced mandate), for 
which sugarcane ethanol, biodiesel and cellulosic biofuels can compete.  
                                                 
11
 Overall renewable biofuels mandate only cannot induce two-way trade in ethanol either. 
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The cellulosic biofuels mandate has been set to near zero, and it cannot compete with 
biodiesel and sugarcane ethanol at this stage. We don’t consider it in our model. In this 
section, we consider the equilibrium that the other advanced mandate is met by sugarcane 
ethanol. And we will relax this assumption to include biodiesel in the following section. 
Let Q
M
 be the leftover overall mandate excluding the advanced mandate, and Qadv
M
 
represents the other advanced mandate. Then the overall mandate for ethanol would be Q
M 
+ 
Qadv
M
. When there is policy intervention, the supply and demand prices of ethanol might 
differ, which depends on whether these mandates are binding or non-binding. When both 
mandates are non-binding, the U.S. would import more than the other advanced mandate, Ie > 
Q
M
, and pe = pe
BR
+ c at equilibrium. Conditions (2.3) to (2.6) still apply and ethanol supply 
price equals ethanol demand price. When both mandates are binding, U.S. ethanol demand is 
exogenously set to be Q
M
 + Qadv
M
, and Ie = Qadv
M
. Together with conditions (2.3) to (2.7), 
equilibrium prices and quantities can be calculated. When only the other advanced mandate 
is binding, only U.S. ethanol imports would be set to Qadv
M
, but pe= pe
D
. Here the ethanol 
supply price is for the conventional ethanol. Next we show how these mandates are 
implemented and how conventional and advanced biofuels markets are separated through the 
compliance scheme. 
RIN Prices 
The mandated volumes of biofuels are enforced by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) through the market for biofuel Renewable Identification Numbers, which is a 
38-character numeric code that is assigned to a volume of biofuel through the distribution 
system and ownership changes. Once the biofuel is blended, the RIN may be separated and 
used for compliance of the mandate. Obligated parties, including individual gasoline and 
14 
 
diesel producers and importers, are required to meet their volume obligations set by EPA, 
which are based on their annual production and imports of gasoline. Obligated parties can 
choose to buy biofuel, blend it, and keep the RIN, or they can enter the RIN market to buy 
RINs from others.
12
 This compliance scheme distinguishes conventional corn ethanol and 
imported sugarcane ethanol, and makes it possible to price different biofuels separately. 
Following Babcock (2010), the price of RIN represents the gap between the supply 
price and the demand price at any given amount of biofuel.  
𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 𝑝𝑒 − 𝑝𝑒
𝐷 (2.8) 
If consumption of a biofuel within a calendar year begins to lag behind the pace 
needed to meet the annual mandated volume, then the demand for RINs would increase, 
which pushes up RIN prices. The increase in RIN prices increases biofuel prices received by 
the producers, who will then increase biofuels production and the following blending pace. 
Figure 2.2 shows the equilibrium RIN prices with non-binding or binding ethanol 
mandates. The upward sloping curve S denotes U.S. ethanol supply, while downward sloping 
curve D represents U.S. ethanol demand. The market clearing price and quantity are given by 
P
*
 and Q
*
. The vertical line indicates the mandated quantity. In panel (a), the mandate is not 
binding, with equilibrium quantity larger than the mandate, so the conventional RIN price 
(denoted by RINcon) equals zero. In panel (b), the mandate is binding. The demand for 
ethanol is set exogenously to the mandate. RINcon equals the gap between the supply and 
demand prices at the quantity of the mandate. 
                                                 
12
 RINs created in one year can also be carried over to the next year. But obligated parties can use only up to 
20% of carry-over RINs to meet their present mandate. And RINs are only valid for two years. We don’t 
consider carry-over RINs in our model. When the carry-over RINs are used to meet the present mandate, the 
demand for RINs would decrease, and the RIN price goes down. That would be one of the reasons why our 
RIN prices are higher than those from others study.  
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Figure 2.2: Determinations of RIN price when the mandate is (a) non-binding and (b) 
binding. 
 
With the assumption that using sugarcane ethanol to meet the advanced mandate, the 
U.S. will always import sugarcane ethanol from Brazil, at least an amount equal to the other 
advanced mandate. So the supply price of the advanced biofuel and the corresponding 
advanced biofuel RIN price RINadv should satisfy: 
𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑣
𝑆 = 𝑝𝑒
𝐵𝑅 + 𝑐 (2.9) 
𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑎𝑑𝑣 = 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑣
𝑆 −⁡𝑝𝑒
𝐷 (2.10) 
Advanced RIN Supply from Sugarcane Ethanol 
In the above section, we illustrate the equilibrium conditions for the conventional and 
advanced biofuels RIN prices, given the assumption that the other advanced biofuels 
mandate is met by sugarcane ethanol imported from Brazil. Here we discuss the advanced 
RIN supply from the sugarcane ethanol market. 
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We start the discussion from a hypothetical case that there is no advanced mandate, 
Qadv
M
= 0.The market equilibrium is indexed by superscript 0, (Ie
0
, Xe
0
, RINcon
0
).We divide 
our analysis into three scenarios based on U.S. ethanol trade pattern under the hypothetical 
case. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Comparative static analyses of the impacts of the other advanced mandate 
on U.S. and Brazilian markets when the U.S. has to import sugarcane ethanol to meet 
the other advanced mandate 
 
For scenarios that U.S. imports amount is less than that of the other advanced 
mandate in the hypothetical case, the comparative static analysis of the impact of adding 
other advanced mandate is depicted in Figure 2.3. U.S. demand and supply are given by D 
and S, D
BR
 and S
BR
 for Brazil. Corresponding market clear equilibrium prices are P and P
BR
. 
To satisfy the other advanced mandate, the U.S. has to import the shortage ΔM from Brazil. 
Then the domestic supply in the U.S. increases from S to S1, while Brazilian domestic supply 
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decreases from S
BR
 to S
BR
1. U.S. ethanol equilibrium price drops to P1 and Brazilian ethanol 
price increases to P
BR
1. Then it is potential for the U.S. to start exporting or export more, due 
to the increase in U.S. excess supply and Brazilian excess demand. 
Scenario 1: U.S. Exports to Brazil when Qadv
M
 = 0 
If the U.S. exports corn ethanol to Brazil under the hypothetical case, Xe
0
>Ie
0
=0, 
adding the other advanced mandate induces the U.S. to import an amount of Qadv
M
 sugarcane 
ethanol. Ethanol imports enlarge the ethanol price between the U.S. and Brazil, which 
promotes more exports to Brazil. Therefore, the U.S. imports an amount of Qadv
M
 sugarcane 
ethanol from Brazil, and at the same time exports corn ethanol to Brazil, which forms a two-
way trade in ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil. At equilibrium, Ie= Qadv
M
, Xe> 0, and pe= 
pe
BR
 – c. And the advanced RIN price is always more than the conventional RIN price by an 
amount of two times transportation, because 
𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑎𝑑𝑣 = 𝑝𝑎𝑑𝑣
𝑆 − 𝑝𝑒
𝐷 = 𝑝𝑒
𝐵𝑅 + 𝑐 − 𝑝𝑒
𝐷 = 𝑝𝑒 − 𝑝𝑒
𝐷 + 2𝑐 = 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛 + 2𝑐 (2.11) 
When the mandate is binding under the hypothetical case, RINcon
0 
> 0, after adding 
the other advanced mandate, the conventional ethanol mandate still binds. Combining U.S. 
and Brazilian ethanol market equilibrium conditions, De(pe
D
,pg) = Q
M
 + Qadv
M
 and pe = pe
BR
 – 
c , we have 
𝑆𝑒(𝑝𝑒) + 𝑆𝑒
𝐵𝑅(𝑝𝑒 + 𝑐) = 𝑄
𝑀 + 𝑄𝑎𝑑𝑣
𝑀 + 𝐷𝑒
𝐵𝑅(𝑝𝑒 + 𝑐) (2.12) 
𝑑𝑝𝑒
𝑑𝑄𝑎𝑑𝑣
𝑀 =
1
𝑑𝑆𝑒
𝑑𝑝𝑒
+
𝑑𝑆𝑒
𝐵𝑅
𝑑𝑝𝑒
𝐵𝑅 −
𝑑𝐷𝑒
𝐵𝑅
𝑑𝑝𝑒
𝐵𝑅
> 0 (2.13) 
Where dSe/dpe > 0, dSe
BR
/dpe
BR 
> 0, and dDe
BR
/dpe
BR 
< 0. Equation (2.13) implies that the 
supply price of ethanol in the U.S. increases with Qadv
M
. The demand price decreases with the 
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other advanced mandate. Then the conventional RIN price increases as the other advanced 
mandate increases, as depicted in panel (a) of Figure 2.4.  
When the mandate is not binding under the hypothetical case, RINcon
0
 =0, U.S. 
imports of sugarcane ethanol will squeeze out the same amount of corn ethanol from the 
domestic market. So when the other advanced mandate is less than U.S. excess domestic 
supply beyond Q
M
, the conventional mandate is still non-binding. As the other advanced 
mandate increases, the conventional mandate will eventually bind and the relationship 
between the RIN prices and the other advanced mandate is identical to the binding case, as 
shown in panel (b) of Figure 2.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: The relationship between RINs prices and the other advanced mandate 
when the U.S. exports to Brazil with (a) binding conventional mandate and (b) non-
binding conventional mandate under the hypothetical case that no advanced mandate 
exists. 
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Scenario 2:  no trade between U.S. and Brazil when Qadv
M
 = 0 
If there is no trade in ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil under the hypothetical case, 
Xe
0 
= Ie
0
 = 0, similar as scenario 1, adding the other advanced mandate induces the U.S. to 
import an amount of Qadv
M
 sugarcane ethanol, which increases the likelihood of U.S. exports. 
When the mandate is binding under the hypothetical case, RINcon
0 
> 0, after adding 
the other advanced mandate, the conventional ethanol mandate continues to be binding. U.S. 
imports of sugarcane ethanol increase its potential to export corn ethanol to Brazil. When the 
other advanced mandate is too small to incentive the U.S. to export, there would be a one-
way trade from Brazil to the U.S., Ie= Qadv
M
 and Xe = 0. Together with De(pe
D
,pg) = Q
M
 + 
Qadv
M
, we have  
𝑆𝑒(𝑝𝑒) + 𝑄𝑎𝑑𝑣
𝑀 = 𝑄𝑀 + 𝑄𝑎𝑑𝑣
𝑀 = 𝐷𝑒(𝑝𝑒
𝐷) (2.14) 
So U.S. ethanol supply price remains the same, while U.S. ethanol demand price 
decreases with the other advanced mandate. For Brazil, domestic supply decrease pushes up 
the ethanol price. Therefore, both conventional and advanced RIN prices increases with the 
other advanced RIN mandate. But the gap between RINcon and RINadv is less than 2c, because 
𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑎𝑑𝑣 = 𝑝𝑒
𝐵𝑅 + 𝑐 − 𝑝𝑒
𝐷 = 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛 + 𝑐 + 𝑝𝑒
𝐵𝑅 − 𝑝𝑒 < 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛 + 2𝑐 (2.15) 
where |pe
BR
 – pe
S
| <c is due to the condition that there is no trade in corn ethanol between the 
U.S. and Brazil. However, increases in the other advanced mandate will eventually induce 
the U.S to export corn ethanol to Brazil, and the gap between the conventional and advanced 
RIN price will then remain at 2c as in Figure 2.5 (a). 
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Figure 2.5: The relationship between RINs prices and the other advanced mandate 
when there is no trade between U.S. and Brazil with (a) binding conventional mandate 
and (b) non-binding conventional mandate under the hypothetical case that no 
advanced mandate exists. 
 
When the mandate is not binding under the hypothetical case, RINcon
0
 = 0, if the other 
advanced mandate is so small that the conventional mandate continues to be non-binding, 
then RINcon remains at 0, while RINadv would be positive but less than 2c, and increasing with 
the other advanced mandate. But eventually, increases in the other advanced mandate will 
lower U.S. demand enough to make the conventional mandate bind (Figure 2.5 (a)). It is also 
possible that increases in the other advanced mandate induce the U.S. to export to Brazil with 
U.S. conventional mandate still non-binding, which instead creates the situation in Figure 2.4 
(b). 
Scenario 3:  U.S. Imports from Brazil when Qadv
M
 = 0 
When the U.S. imports from Brazil under the hypothetic case, Ie
0 
> Xe
0
 = 0, with the 
advanced mandate, imported sugarcane ethanol is used to meet the advanced mandate first.  
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When the mandate is binding under the hypothetical case, RINcon
0 
> 0, imports are 
diverted to meet the other advanced mandate, so the conventional mandate still binds. U.S. 
ethanol supply price would increase to encourage more production and imports to meet the 
conventional mandate. As long as the U.S. uses sugarcane ethanol to meet the conventional 
mandate, the conventional RIN price equals the advanced RIN price as the following: 
𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑎𝑑𝑣 = 𝑝𝑒
𝐵𝑅 + 𝑐 − 𝑝𝑒
𝐷 = 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑐𝑜𝑛 (2.16) 
Demand price decreases to reach the increased overall mandate. So both RIN prices 
are positive and increasing with the other advanced mandate. However, increase in the other 
advanced mandate will eventually result in all imported sugarcane ethanol being used to meet 
the other advanced mandate. Further increase will lower U.S. domestic supply price and 
increase Brazilian ethanol price, which makes it non-profitable for the U.S. to import more 
than the other advanced mandate. Then the advanced RIN price will exceed the convention 
RIN price, as shown in Figure 2.6 (a). 
When the mandate is not binding under the hypothetic case, RINcon
0 
= 0, if the other 
advanced mandate can be met by the imported sugarcane ethanol and the conventional 
mandate is still non-binding, both the conventional and advanced RIN prices are zero. 
However, as the other advanced mandate increases, if U.S. imports more than the amount of 
the other advanced mandate, the conventional mandate will eventually bind. Then both RIN 
prices become positive and increase with the other advanced mandate, as illustrated in Figure 
2.6 (b). It is also possible that as the other advanced mandate increases the advanced mandate 
binds with the conventional mandate non-binding. Then the U.S. will not import more than 
the other advanced mandate, as the situation in Figure 2.5 (b). 
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Figure 2.6: The relationship between RINs prices and the other advanced mandate 
when the U.S. imports from Brazil with (a) binding conventional mandate and (b) non-
binding conventional mandate under the hypothetical case that no advanced mandate 
exists. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Advanced RIN supply from sugarcane ethanol when (a) the U.S. imports 
from Brazil with a non-binding mandate and (b) other situations, under the 
hypothetical case that no advanced mandate exists 
 
In summary, both the conventional and advanced RIN prices are non-decreasing with 
the other advanced mandate. We also get insights of the biofuels RIN prices from the trade 
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pattern between the U.S. and Brazil. The price gap between the conventional and advanced 
RIN is two times transportation cost when there is two-way trade. When the U.S. only 
imports from Brazil the amount of the other advanced mandate, the price gap is less than 2c. 
As long as the U.S. imports more than the other advanced mandate, the conventional RIN 
price equals the advanced RIN price. 
In the next section, we take into account of the competence from an alternative source 
of advanced biofuels, biodiesel. For ease of comparison, we simplify the above discussion 
about the advanced RIN supply from imported sugarcane ethanol. When the U.S. imports 
from Brazil with non-binding conventional mandate in the hypothetical case, the advanced 
RIN price starts from zero and becomes positive as the other advanced mandate increases 
(Figure 2.7 (a)). Otherwise, the advanced RIN price is always positive and non-decreasing 
with the other advanced mandate (Figure 2.7 (b)). In the latter case, denote RINsc
0
 as the 
hypothetic minimum advanced RIN price. 
Advanced RIN Supply from Biodiesel 
In the above model, we assume that the other advanced mandate is met with imported 
sugarcane ethanol. Actually, multiple fuels are certified as advanced biofuels that can be used 
to meet the advanced mandate. The most important biofuel that qualifies is biodiesel made 
from soybean oil, animal fats or waste grease, which means that it is a substitute for 
sugarcane ethanol in meeting the other advanced mandate
13
. A complication of including 
biodiesel is that it also has a mandate that only it can meet before any volume is available to 
meet the advanced mandate.  We first examine the biodiesel market with only the sub-
                                                 
13
 According to RFS, Biodiesel could also compete with corn ethanol to meet the conventional mandate. But 
currently the biodiesel RIN price is still much higher than conventional RIN price. Biodiesel has little 
advantage to compete with corn ethanol to meet the leftover overall mandate. We omit this possibility in our 
model. 
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mandate just for the biodiesel (denoted as Qbd
M
). Then add in the other advanced mandate 
and analyze the advanced RIN supply from biodiesel. 
With only the biodiesel sub-mandate, market clearing condition and corresponding 
biodiesel RIN prices are shown in Figure 2.8. Biodiesel demand and supply curves are 
denoted as D and S, with equilibrium price and quantity (P
**
, Q
**
). The vertical solid line is 
the amount of the biodiesel sub-mandate. If the biodiesel mandate is not binding, with Q
** 
> 
Qbd
M
, the biodiesel supply price Pbd
S
 equals the biodiesel demand price Pbd
D
, and biodiesel 
RIN price RINbd
0
 is zero. If the biodiesel mandate is binding, the demand for biodiesel is 
exogenously set to Qbd
M
. The biodiesel RIN price is positive and equals the gap between the 
biodiesel supply and demand prices, represented by a - b. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Determinations of biodiesel RIN price when the biodiesel sub-mandate is (a) 
non-binding and (b) binding. 
 
Next, we consider the case with the other advanced mandate met by biodiesel. 
Adding the other advanced mandate works as an increased biodiesel mandate. If the biodiesel 
sub-mandate is binding, RINbd
0 
> 0, it remains binding with the other advanced mandate. 
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The increased mandate leads to a higher supply price and a lower demand price as 
depicted in Figure 2.8 (b). The dotted vertical line is the summed mandate. The advanced 
RIN price exceeds the initial biodiesel RIN price, because the price gap increases from a – b 
to e – f.  So when the biodiesel sub-mandate is binding, the advanced RIN price is always 
positive and increasing with the other advanced mandate (Figure 2.9(b)). If the biodiesel sub-
mandate is non-binding, RINbd
0
 = 0, when the other advanced mandate is small enough that 
the increased mandate is still non-binding, the advanced RIN price would be zero (Figure 2.8 
(a)). But as the other advanced mandate increases, it will eventually bind and the advanced 
RIN price will become positive and increase with the other advanced mandate (Figure 2.9 
(a)). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Advanced RIN supply from biodiesel when (a) biodiesel sub-mandate is 
non-binding and (b) biodiesel sub-mandate is binding. 
 
Equilibrium for the Advanced RIN with Biodiesel 
Considering the competition between biodiesel and imported sugarcane ethanol to 
meet the other advanced mandate, there are three possibilities to meet the other advanced 
mandate: (1) use sugarcane ethanol only; (2) use biodiesel only; (3) use both sugarcane 
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ethanol and biodiesel. If only use one fuel to meet the other advanced mandate, the advanced 
RIN price must not be greater than that of using any of the other fuel. Otherwise, both fuels 
would be used to meet the other advanced mandate. The conditions for interior solutions are: 
𝑄𝑠𝑐 + 𝑄𝑏𝑑 = 𝑄𝑎𝑑𝑣
𝑀  (2.17) 
𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑎𝑑𝑣 = 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑠𝑐 = 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑏𝑑 (2.18) 
where Qsc and Qbd are the corresponding amounts of the other advanced mandate that are met 
by sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel. RINsc is the advanced RIN price when hypothetically 
using sugarcane ethanol to meet an amount of Qsc advanced mandate. Similarly, RINbd is the 
advanced RIN price using biodiesel to meet an amount of Qbd advanced mandate. 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Advanced RIN supply when both sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel are 
qualified as advanced biofuels. 
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Here, we also show the determination of the shares of the other advanced mandate 
met by sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel by graphs. There are four possible configurations of 
the total advanced RIN supply from biodiesel and sugarcane ethanol, shown in the four 
panels of Figure 2.10. The advanced RIN supply from sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel are 
noted as ‘sugarcane’ and ‘biodiesel’, respectively. At each given advanced RIN price, the 
total supply of the advanced RIN (denoted as ‘total’), is the horizontal sum of the supply 
from sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel. RINadv is the advanced RIN price when the total supply 
equals the other advanced mandate, and Qsc and Qbd are determined by the intersections of 
the equilibrium advanced RIN price with the supplies of advanced RINs from sugarcane 
ethanol and biodiesel. Interior solutions are depicted in Figure 2.10, but it is easy to see how 
a decrease in the other advanced mandate would result in only one of the fuels being used to 
meet the advanced mandate. 
To some extent, U.S. domestic produced biodiesel can decrease U.S. dependence on 
the imports of sugarcane ethanol to meet the other advanced mandate, and then reduce the 
possibility of two-way trade. If U.S. biodiesel is competitive, the U.S. might not have to 
induce more imports just because of the mandates. Competence from biodiesel to meet the 
other advanced mandate could also reduce the advanced RIN price. In Figure 10, the 
advanced RIN prices using only one fuel, corresponding to points s and b, are at least as 
much as the advanced RIN price using both fuels, RINadv. 
Calibration 
We simulate the model for the marketing year 2013/14 to estimate the potential 
impacts of RFS biofuels mandates on the ethanol trade pattern between the U.S. and Brazil, 
various RIN prices and related commodity prices. Our simulation method for U.S. and 
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Brazilian ethanol market mainly follows Babcock et al. (2010). To account for the 
uncertainties in the feedstock yields, gasoline prices in the U.S., we take values of all these 
variables from our projected distributions. Given 500 randomly combination of draws of all 
these variables, we calculate the equilibrium prices and quantities. The averages are then 
used to show the impacts of RFS mandates in 2013/14. 
U.S. Corn Market 
Corn supply equals beginning stocks plus the product of yield and harvested acreage. 
We fix the amount of corn harvested area at 87.7 million acres as in November 11, 2012 
World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE)
14
 projections for the marketing 
year 2012/13. Corn beginning stock equals the projection for 2012/13 ending stock, 647 
million bushels. We simulate corn yield distribution from U.S. historical corn yield data from 
1980 to 2011, which is from the database of National Agriculture Statistics Service 
(NASS)
15
. We fit the linear de-trended data to a beta distribution, with a mean of 161.6 
bushels per acre (bu/ac), a standard deviation of 11.6 bu/ac, a maximum of 185 bu/ac, and a 
minimum of 100 bu/ac. 
Food, feed and net export demand of corn are calibrated to linear functions, with 
elasticities -0.096, -0.25 and -0.6, respectively (Babcock et al. (2010)). With evidence of the 
poor yield in 2012, these demands are calibrated to fit WASDE
16
 prices and quantities for the 
normal year 2010/11. Corn storage demand is modeled using a beta distribution based on the 
relationship between corn prices and ratios of corn storage demand to corn production. 
                                                 
14
 See http://www.usda.gov/oce/commodity/wasde 
15
 See http://www.nass.usda.gov/ 
16
 We assume that the substitution effect of the dried distillers grains with solubles (co-product of ethanol 
produced from corn) as feeds use if accounted for in the WASDE projections. 
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Resulting parameters are p = 1.8 and q = 1.1. Data we use are from 2000/01 and 2010/11, 
with the ratio constrained between 5% to 25% and corn price bounded by $8/bushel. 
U.S. Ethanol Market 
According to the RFA, we assume that all U.S. corn ethanol plant produce 2.8 gallons 
of ethanol and 17.5 pounds of DDGS per bushel of corn, α = 2.8.17 Following Babcock et al. 
(2010), we assume the price of DDGS is 85% of the corn price. The other operating cost is 
74 cents per gallon ethanol produced, which is calculated from zero profit condition and 
assumed to be constant. γ = 2.8/ (1- 17.5/56*0.85) = 3.8.18 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11: U.S. ethanol demand 
 
                                                 
17
 According to the RFA, dry mill facilities represent nearly 90% of U.S. total ethanol production and a modern 
dry mill ethanol refinery produce approximately 2.8 gallons of ethanol and 17.5 pounds of DDGS from a 
bushel of corn. 
18
 We assume 1 bushel corn weights 56 lbs. 
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The demand of ethanol is calibrated using a beta distribution based on its relationship 
with the relative price of ethanol to gasoline.
19
 The relative price of ethanol to gasoline is 
constrained between 0.5 and 1.1, and the maximum consumption of ethanol is assumed to be 
20 BG at the price ratio lower than 0.5 indicating that low enough ethanol price might induce 
investments and use of E85. As in Figure 2.11, when the wholesale price ratio of ethanol to 
gasoline is 0.9, ethanol demand is about 12.4 BG; when the price ratio decreases to 0.6, 
ethanol demand increases to 13.2 BG. The resulting parameters are p = 180.39 and q = 
322.35.  
Gasoline price is simulated as a lognormal distribution with a mean of $2.55/gallon 
and a standard deviation of $0.62/gallon. We estimate the mean as the average of the 2013/14 
gasoline RBOB futures prices at NYMEX,
20
 and the standard deviation from the average 
implied volatility of gasoline RBOB options at NYMEX. 
Brazilian Ethanol Market 
Following Babcock et al. (2010), Brazilian ethanol demand is modeled from Brazilian 
auto fleet size. In Brazil, ethanol vehicles use hydrous ethanol with 5% water; gasoline 
vehicles use gasoline blended with anhydrous ethanol; flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs) can switch 
between two forms of fuel. The demand for fuel ethanol is: 
𝐷𝑒
𝐵𝑅 = 𝑁𝑒𝐿𝑒 + 𝛽𝑁𝑓𝐿𝑒 + 𝛿𝐿𝑔(𝑁𝑔 + (1 − 𝛽)𝑁𝑓) (2.19) 
Ne, Nf and Ng denote the ethanol, flex-fuel and gasoline vehicles fleet size, 
respectively.  Le and Lg are the volumes of fuel consumed by a vehicle per year. β is the 
average share of FFVs that using ethanol per year. δ is the mandatory blend level in Brazil, 
                                                 
19
 Anderson (2011) also finds that ethanol demand as a substitute of gasoline is sensitive to the relative price of 
ethanol to gasoline. 
20
 See http://nymex.com/index.aspx 
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which is assumed to be 25%.
21
 The fleet size in 2013/14 is calibrated to the weighted average 
of the linear trend level in 2013 and 2014. The historical data is from Brazilian Sugarcane 
Industry Association (UNICA). Three motorcycles are treated as one car. The resulting 
values are 15.7 million for gasoline vehicles, 0.74 million for ethanol vehicles and 21.8 
million for FFVs. Annual ethanol consumption per car (Le) is modeled as a constant elasticity 
(-0.04) function of the ethanol to gasoline price ratio and adjusted to anhydrous in gallons. 
Coefficients are derived by fixing ethanol consumption per vehicle per year at 1885 liters at a 
price ratio of 0.7.
22
 Considering that ethanol has only 2/3 energy content of gasoline, blended 
gasoline consumption per year satisfies Le = Lg*(0.25*1.05 + 0.75*1.5). For FFVs owners, 
whether to use gasoline or ethanol depends on the relative price of ethanol to gasoline. The 
relationship between δ and the relative price is modeled as a standard beta distribution with p 
= 2.6987, and q = 1.3579.
23
 And the transportation cost from U.S. plant to Brazilian plant is 
assumed to be $0.38/gallon
24
. 
Brazilian ethanol supply is modeled as a constant elasticity function of ethanol to 
gasoline price ratio. The short-run elasticity is set to 0.04 to reflect the flexibility of Brazilian 
sugar mills to switch between producing sugar and ethanol based on the relative prices. The 
                                                 
21
 In Brazil, the blend rate was lowered from 25% to 20% in October 2011, due to tight ethanol supplies. But it 
is expected to be back up to 25% on May 1
st
, 2013. 
22
 According to USDA, the Brazilian light vehicle fleet of 18 million units consumes 4.2 billion gallons per year 
of gasoline and 3.1 billion gallons per year of hydrated and anhydrous ethanol, and gasoline is blended with 
23% anhydrous ethanol. We construct Le by adding the ethanol consumption to the hydrous ethanol energy 
equivalent amount of the gasoline consumption. 
23
 In Babcock, Barr, and Carriquiry 2010, coefficients p and q are derived from two calibration points. In 2009, 
at the price ratio 0.56, the share of FFVs using ethanol was determined by UNICA to be 0.7. When price 
ratio rose to 0.73 in January and February, the share declined to about 0.44.  
24
 Crago, Khanna, Barton, Giuliani, and Amaral (2010) estimated the average transportation cost from Brazil 
refinery to U.S. port to be 0.18 Reals per liter. With our assumption of exchange rate at 2.05 Reals per 
Dollar, it is $0.33/gallon. We include a moderate cost from U.S. port to places for blending. 
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coefficient is calibrated to the point with 26 billion liters ethanol production at the ethanol to 
gasoline price ratio 0.7.
25
 
Soybean and Soybean Products Market 
As the U.S., Brazil and Argentina account for about 80% of the production, and more 
than 85% of the exports of soybean, about 80% of the exports of soybean products, we only 
consider these three countries in the world supply. According to projections for 2012/13, 
November, 2012 WASDE report, we fix U.S. soybean harvested area at 75.7 million acres, 
27.5 million hectors (ha) for Brazil and 19.7 million hectors for Argentina
26
. U.S. Soybean 
beginning stock is 140 million bushels, 17.17 million metric ton (mt) for Brazil, and 21.65 
million metric ton for Argentina. Similar as corn yield, we simulate all soybean yields as beta 
distributions using NASS and USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)
27
 historical yield 
data. U.S. soybean yield has a mean of 44.7 bu/ac (3.05 t/ha for Brazil, 2.77 t/ha for 
Argentina), a standard deviation of 2.8 bu/ac (0.18 t/ha for Brazil, 0.26 t/ha for Argentina), a 
maximum of 51 bu/ac (3.5 t/ha for Brazil, 3.2 t/ha for Argentina), and a minimum of 34 
bu/ac (2.5 t/ha for Brazil, 2 t/ha for Argentina). 
Soybean utilization includes crush, storage, net exports, and other demands. Crushing 
productivity parameters are derived through dividing soybean meals and oil productions by 
soybean crush quantities. Crush demands are modeled as linear function of the crush margin, 
which are calculated by subtracting cost of one bushel soybean from revenues of soybean 
meals and soybean oil produced. Storage and other demand are calibrated as linear functions 
of soybean price. Prices and quantities used to derive the parameters are from November, 
                                                 
25
 The calibration point is according to 2013 Brazilian ethanol production projection in USDA GAIN report.  
26
 We report their original units in the study, and adjust the units in our calculation.  
27
 Brazilian and Argentine historical yields data is from USDA Foreign Agricultural Service. 
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2012 WASDE. Soybean net exports equal the beginning stock plus the production and 
excluding the crush, storage and other demands. U.S. crush, storage and other demands 
elasticities we use are 0.3, -0.65 and -0.1 (0.23, -0.65 and -0.03 for Brazil, and 0.2, -0.65 and 
-0.25 for Argentina), respectively. 
Soybean meals and soybean oil beginning stocks are also from WASDE projections 
for storage demands in 2012/13. Soybean meals are utilized to domestic, storage and net 
export demands. Domestic and storage demands are calibrated as linear functions of the 
soybean meals price. Domestic and storage demands elasticities are -0.25 and -0.65 for all 
three countries. Soybean oil is utilized to domestic (non-biodiesel), biodiesel use, storage, 
and net export demands in the U.S., while in Brazil and Argentina we don’t differentiate use 
for biodiesel. Elasticities for domestic and storage demands are -0.1 and -0.65, respectively. 
Data for all calibration points is from WASDE, and the share of soybean oil used for 
biodiesel is from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA).
28
 Net exports equal 
supplies from soybean subtracting domestic and storage demands. 
World demand and supply of soybean, soybean meals and soybean oil are calibrated 
as linear functions of the world prices. Elasticities are -0.1, -0.1, -1 for soybean and soybean 
meals and soybean oil, respectively. Quantities are the sum of the net exports of the U.S., 
Brazil and Argentina, and we use U.S. prices as the world prices. All data is from WASDE. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 The share of soybean oil for biodiesel use comes from U.S. bioenergy statistics table 6 “Soybean oil supply, 
disappearance and share of biodiesel use”. See www.era.usda.gov 
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U.S. Biodiesel Market 
We fix U.S. biodiesel production from sources other than soybean oil at 680 million 
gallons.
29
 According to Paulson and Ginder (2007), one pound of feedstock can produce 
0.982 pound of biodiesel. Given there are 7.4 pounds in a gallon, we have 7.55 pounds 
soybean oil to produce one gallon of biodiesel. The biodiesel margin per gallon equals the 
price of biodiesel minus the cost of required soybean oil and other costs ($0.4/gallon)
30
. We 
derive the supply curve of biodiesel from soybean oil indirectly through the relationship 
between biodiesel production and the biodiesel margin. It is simply modeled as a linear 
function. Data for the share of soybean oil used for biodiesel from 2008/09 to 2010/11 is 
from EIA, and divide by 7.55 to get the biodiesel production from soybean oil. Annual 
average biodiesel margins data is collected from Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development (CARD). 
The U.S. biodiesel net export is assumed to be zero.
31
 And assume that biodiesel 
mandate is always binding. 
RFS Mandates 
In 2013 the RFS mandates total U.S. biofuel consumption of 16.55 billion gallons. Of 
this volume 2.75 BG is required to be met by advanced biofuels, and the rest 13.8 BG is 
mandated on renewable biofuels (conventional mandate in our study). The 2.75 BG advanced 
mandate includes 1.28 BG mandate on biodiesel. Because biodiesel has about 50% more 
energy content than ethanol, each gallon of biodiesel counts as 1.5 gallons of ethanol 
                                                 
29
 This assumption follows EPA final rules about 2013 biomass-based diesel renewable fuel volume. And we 
assume this will not change in 2014.  
30
 Again, using the cost estimations in Paulson and Ginder (2007), we define other costs as the sum of the costs 
of other inputs, operating expenses and capital costs minus the credits from co-products. 
31
 According to EIA, exports of biodiesel peaked in 2008 largely due to a perverse effect of a biodiesel tax 
credit in the European Union. Exports then dropped to near zero after the effect was eliminated. 
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equivalent. So multiplying 1.28 BG by 1.5, biodiesel mandate counts as 1.92 BG towards the 
advanced mandate, which leaves an amount of 0.83 BG advanced mandate (other advanced 
mandate in our study) to be met by sugarcane ethanol from Brazil or U.S. biodiesel. The 
cellulosic mandate has been set to near zero, so we neglect cellulosic ethanol in our analysis. 
In 2014, the total biofuel mandate increases to 18.15 BG, of which 14.4 BG mandates to be 
met by conventional biofuels, and 3.75 BG met by advanced biofuels. We assume that 
biodiesel mandate remains the same in 2014. It leaves an amount of 1.83 BG mandate to 
other advanced biofuels. The weighted averages of mandates in 2013 and 2014 are used for 
the marketing year 2013/14. The resulting conventional mandate is 14.2BG, 1.28 BG for 
biodiesel, and 1.5 BG for other advanced mandate. All mandates used in our study are 
illustrated in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Assumptions of U.S. Renewable Fuels Mandates (BG)  
Year 
Conventional 
Renewable 
Biofuels 
Advanced 
Biofuels 
Cellulosic 
Biofuels 
Biomass-
Based Diesel 
Other 
Advanced 
Biofuels
*
 
Total 
RFS 
2013 13.8 2.75 0 1.28 0.83 16.55 
2014 14.4 3.75 0 1.28 1.83 18.15 
2013/14 14.2 3.42 0 1.28 1.5 17.62 
Note: See http://www.ethanolrfa.org for the RFS mandates. 
*
Other advanced biofuel 
mandates are ethanol energy equivalent volumes. 
 
Simulation Results for 2013/14 
Given the assumptions of the exogenous parameters and the distributions of the 
stochastic variables, we now consider alternative policy scenarios for the marketing year 
2013/14. These scenarios are as follows: 
1. Conventional mandate. 
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2. All mandates (Constrained), other advanced mandate can only be met by 
sugarcane ethanol. 
3. All mandates, other advanced mandate can be met by both sugarcane ethanol 
and biodiesel. 
4. No Mandates. 
Table 2.2 represents the number of observations of no trade, one-way trade or two-
way trade in ethanol out of our 500 simulations for each scenario. For all scenarios, we report 
in Table 2.3 the implied mandates and average results of key variables. In Table 2.4, results 
for interior solutions that using both sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel to meet the other 
advanced mandate are reported. Our results show that RFS mandates, especially the other 
advanced mandate that could differentiate U.S. corn ethanol and Brazilian sugarcane ethanol, 
help induce the two-way trade between the U.S. and Brazil. U.S. biodiesel could help meet 
part of the other advanced mandate, which then reduce U.S. imports of sugarcane ethanol to 
meet the RFS mandates. But this effect is far from eliminating U.S. dependence on imports 
from Brazil. 
 
Table 2.2: Impacts of RFS mandates on the trade of ethanol between the U.S. and 
Brazil 
 
Conventional 
Mandate 
All Mandates 
(Constrained) 
All Mandates No Mandates 
No Trade 192 0 0 97 
U.S. Imports from Brazil 9 43 60 1 
U.S. Exports to Brazil 299 0 0 402 
Two-way Trade 0 457 440 0 
Note: All results are expresses in number of observations out of our 500 simulations. 
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Conventional Mandate 
In this scenario, there exist the 14.2 BG conventional mandate and 1.28 BG biodiesel 
mandate. We assume that biodiesel is not as competitive as corn ethanol to meet the 
conventional mandate, the ethanol and biodiesel markets are solved separately, given 
exogenous gasoline price. The second column of Table 2.2 reports the number of 
observations of different trade patterns of ethanol, given there is only conventional mandate 
in the ethanol market. Out of our 500 draws, there are 299 observations with the U.S. 
exporting corn ethanol to Brazil, 192 with no trade, and 9 with the U.S. importing from 
Brazil. Without the advanced mandate to differentiate U.S. corn ethanol and Brazilian 
sugarcane ethanol, only one-way trade or no trade of ethanol could happen between the U.S. 
and Brazil. Large domestic demand of ethanol in Brazil pushes up Brazilian ethanol price to 
$2.41/gallon, which makes it profitable for the U.S. to export corn ethanol to Brazil even 
paying the transportation cost. Moreover, for 96% of the simulations, the conventional 
mandate is binding, mainly due to the inelastic ethanol demand assumption. 
The second column of Table 2.3 represents the overall average results with the 
conventional and biodiesel sub-mandate. The average ethanol price in the U.S. is 
$2.03/gallon, 27 cents below Brazilian ethanol Price. Average U.S. production is 14.59 BG, 
with 0.35 BG exporting to Brazil. The average conventional RIN price is $0.75/gallon. The 
average biodiesel RIN price is $1.77/gallon, high above the conventional RIN price. Because 
of U.S. increased production of soybean and large export demands from Brazil and 
Argentina, the soybean and soybean meals prices are very low in our study, while the 
demand for soybean oil for biodiesel use keeps the soybean oil price high. 
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Table 2.3: Average Results for Alternative Biofuels Mandate Scenarios in 2013/14 
 
Conventional 
Mandate 
All Mandates 
(Constrained) 
All 
Mandates 
No 
Mandates 
Conventional Mandate (BG) 14.2 14.2 14.2 0 
Biodiesel Sub-Mandate (BG) 1.28 1.28 1.28 0 
Other Advanced Mandate Met by 
Sugarcane Ethanol (BG) 
0 1.5 1.41 0 
Other Advanced Mandate Met by 
Biodiesel (BG) 
0 0 0.09 0 
Corn Price ($/bushel) 4.93 5.35 5.33 4.34 
U.S. Ethanol Plant Price ($/gallon) 2.03 2.14 2.14 1.88 
Brazilian Ethanol Price ($/gallon) 2.3 2.51 2.49 2.22 
Soybean Price ($/bushel) 8.63 8.63 8.67 8.23 
Soybean Oil Price (cents/lb) 56.55 56.55 57.43 47.36 
Soybean Meals Price ($/short ton) 237.65 237.65 235.63 258.91 
U.S. Ethanol Production (BG) 14.59 15.44 15.4 13.42 
U.S. Ethanol Exports (BG) 0.35 1.22 1.18 0.61 
U.S. Ethanol Imports (BG) 0 1.5 1.41 0 
Conventional RIN price ($/gallon) 0.75 0.86 0.86 0 
Biodiesel RIN price ($/gallon) 1.77 1.77 1.79 0 
Advanced RIN price ($/gallon) 0 1.61 1.59 0 
 
All Mandates (Constrained) 
In this scenario, we assume that all RFS mandates in place, but the other advanced 
mandate can only be met by the imported sugarcane ethanol. Reported in column three of 
Table 2.2, there are 43 observations with the U.S. importing more than the other advanced 
mandate, with low corn yield (122.4 bu/ac) and high gasoline price ($3.53/gallon). 
Comparatively higher demand of ethanol together with shortage of supply induces the U.S. to 
import more than the other advanced mandate to meet the conventional mandate. The rest 
457 observations present two-way trade in ethanol between the U.S. and Brazil. The U.S. has 
to import sugarcane ethanol to meet the other advanced mandate, and at the same time, the 
U.S. exports the corn ethanol to Brazil due to the excess supply of corn ethanol in the U.S. 
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together with increasing domestic demand of ethanol in Brazil. Almost all of the mandates 
become binding, with an amount of 15.7 BG ethanol demand in the U.S. 
The overall average results are shown in the third column of Table 2.3. With the other 
advanced mandate constrained to be met by the sugarcane ethanol, U.S. imports of sugarcane 
ethanol increase to 1.5 BG, which induces the U.S. to export more corn ethanol. U.S. ethanol 
exports increase by 0.87 BG.  Increased export demand causes U.S. ethanol price to increase 
by 11 cents/gallon. U.S. production increased from 14.59 BG to 15.44 BG. In Brazil, ethanol 
price increases 21 cents/gallon because of the positive net export demand. The average 
conventional RIN price increases by 11 cents/gallon, which implies that the conventional 
mandate becomes more binding, and the advanced RIN price is 75 cents, almost equal to two 
times transportation cost, more than the conventional RIN. All results for the soybean, 
soybean products, and biodiesel markets remain the same. As an average, the advanced RIN 
price is still lower than the biodiesel RIN price. 
 
Table 2.4: RIN Prices for Scenarios with All Mandates 
 Percentage
*
 
Conventional 
RIN Price 
Advanced 
RIN Price 
Biodiesel 
 RIN Price 
Other Advanced Mandate 
Met by SC 
0.75 0.83 1.58 1.85 
Other Advanced Mandate 
Met by SC and BD 
0.25 0.94 1.63 1.63 
Note: 
*
Percentage of observations out of our 500 simulations. All RIN prices are in ethanol 
equivalent unit. SC = Sugarcane Ethanol, BD = Biodiesel. 
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All Mandates 
This scenario illustrates the impacts of RFS mandates on the U.S. and Brazil biofuels 
market. Sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel can compete as the other advanced biofuels. There 
are 60 observations with the U.S. importing from Brazil and 440 with two-way trade. 
Biodiesel can help meet 0.09 BG of the other advanced mandate, which reduces U.S. 
dependence on imported sugarcane ethanol to meet the other advanced mandate, and then 
decreases the possibility of two-way trade. But this effect is somehow very small. The U.S. 
still depends on imports to meet the RFS other advanced mandate. 
Table 2.4 reports the percentage of corner and interior solutions and corresponding 
average RINs prices. There are 75% of our observations only using sugarcane ethanol to 
meet the other advanced mandate. Across these observations, the average conventional RIN 
price is $0.83/gallon, and the average advanced RIN price is $1.58/gallon, lower than the 
biodiesel RIN price. This implies that sugarcane ethanol has an absolute advantage as the 
other advanced biofuels. The rest 25% observations use both sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel 
to meet the other advanced mandate, such that the advanced RIN price equal to the biodiesel 
RIN price. And no observation uses only biodiesel. The overall average advanced RIN price 
is $1.59/gallon. Comparing with the case with constrained all mandates, alternative source of 
other advanced biofuels leads to a small decrease in the average corn price, ethanol 
production, ethanol exports and soybean meal price, while increases in average soybean, 
soybean oil prices. 
No Mandates 
To be complete, this scenario assumes a waiver of all biofuels mandates. There are 
402 out of 500 observations with the U.S. exporting to Brazil, and 97 with no trade between 
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the U.S. and Brazil. The conventional mandate reduces the probability for the U.S. to export 
to Brazil by 20%. However, RFS mandates induce two-way trade between the U.S. and 
Brazil, and increase the exports of the U.S.  
If RFS mandates are waived, U.S. average ethanol demand drops from 15.63 BG to 
12.8 BG, and U.S. ethanol production declines by 1.98 BG. The decrease in export demand 
leads to a drop of 12.1% in the U.S. ethanol price, and a drop of 10.8% in Brazilian ethanol 
price. The corn price decreases by 18.6% (or 99 cents/bushel). The average soybean and 
soybean oil prices decline by 5% and 17.5%, respectively. Soybean meals price increases by 
10%. The large impacts of removing all mandates rely on the assumption that no carry-over 
RINs are used to meet the obligations. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, we investigate the robustness of our results to U.S. gasoline price and 
Brazil ethanol production. We vary the two variables one at a time and re-run the model for 
the marketing year 2013/14. And then compare the results for the scenario with all RFS 
mandates. Moreover, we also consider the sensitivity of our results to U.S. corn yield, which 
could imply the effects of shocks in U.S. ethanol supply.  
U.S. Gasoline Price 
We calculate the equilibriums for three fixed gasoline prices: a low gasoline price of 
$1.5/gallon, the average price of $2.55/gallon, and a high price of $3.5/gallon.
32
 The results 
for the scenario with all RFS mandates are shown in Table 2.5. 
                                                 
32
 These gasoline prices used are just to show the effects of gasoline prices on our average results. They do not 
provide any information of the distribution of the gasoline price. 
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U.S. gasoline price has a small effect with all RFS mandates in place, which is away 
from the results in Thompson, Meyer and Westhoff (2008) due to the assumption of the 
inelastic demand of ethanol in the U.S. Because of the difficulty of the U.S. to blend more 
than 10% ethanol into its auto fleets, and the limitations in the investments in E85 and sales 
of flex-fuels vehicles, even with a high gasoline price to promote consumers’ willingness to 
consume ethanol, the RFS mandates are still almost binding. But RFS mandates still help 
induce two-way trade between the U.S. and Brazil. 
 
Table 2.5: Market Effects of U.S. Gasoline Price 
Gasoline Price 1.5$/gallon 2.55$/gallon 3.5$/gallon 
Percentage with Two-way Trade
1
 0.9 0.88 0.87 
Percentage using both fuels
2
 0.1 0.22 0.4 
Corn Price ($/bushel) 5.33 5.32 5.3 
U.S. Ethanol Plant Price ($/gallon) 2.14 2.14 2.13 
Brazil Ethanol Price 
3
($/gallon) 2.5 2.49 2.48 
Soybean Price ($/bushel) 8.65 8.67 8.7 
Soybean Oil Price (cents/pound) 56.85 57.3 58.06 
Soybean Meals Price ($/short ton) 236.96 235.39 234.18 
U.S. Ethanol Production (BG) 15.41 15.39 15.35 
U.S. Ethanol Exports (BG) 1.21 1.19 1.14 
U.S. Ethanol Imports (BG) 1.47 1.43 1.35 
Conventional RIN Price ($/gallon) 1.39 0.86 0.38 
Biodiesel RIN Price ($/gallon) 2.43 1.79 1.23 
Advanced RIN Price ($/gallon) 2.13 1.6 1.11 
Note: All results are reported in the regular units in the market. All RIN prices are in ethanol 
equivalent unit. 1Percentage of observations with the U.S. exporting corn ethanol to Brazil, 
and importing sugarcane ethanol from Brazil simultaneously.2Percentage of observations 
using both sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel to meet the other advanced mandate.3Brazilian 
domestic wholesale anhydrous ethanol price, with exchange rate at 2.05 reals per dollar. 
 
With U.S. biodiesel as an alternative source of the other advanced biofuels, when the 
gasoline price increases, biodiesel becomes comparatively more competitive. At the gasoline 
price of $3.5/gallon, the percentage using both fuels to meet the other advanced mandate 
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increases by 18%. But in general, biodiesel is still more expensive. There is only an amount 
of 0.08 BG decrease in the U.S. imports. But the increase in the gasoline price leads to 
significant drops in the RINs prices through increasing the demand prices, 55.8% in the 
conventional RIN price, 31.3% in the biodiesel RIN price, and 30.6% in the advanced RIN 
price. When the gasoline price decreases, the effects are inversed as shown in Table 2.5. 
Brazilian Ethanol Production 
With concerns about the sensitivity of our results to Brazilian ethanol production, we 
vary the calibration point of Brazil ethanol supply curve in our model. Shocks of Brazilian 
ethanol supply could also come from variations in the sugarcane yield in Brazil and changes 
in world sugar price. But these effects on the average results are similar as our analysis in this 
section. When the price ratio of ethanol to gasoline is 0.7 in Brazil, Brazilian ethanol 
production is recalibrated from the average 26 billion liters to a low production level of 22 
billion liters and a high production level of 30 billion liters. The average results are illustrated 
in Table 2.6. 
When ethanol production is low, 97% of our observations have two-way trade 
happening between the U.S. and Brazil, 9% more than the case with ethanol production about 
26 billion liters. Facing high domestic demand, Brazilian ethanol price increases by 10 cents 
and imports demand of corn ethanol from the U.S. increase by nearly 50% (0.63 BG). U.S. 
ethanol price also increases by 9 cents to entice enough production to meet the increased 
demand from Brazil. U.S. ethanol production increases by 0.63 BG and the corn price rises 
by 5.8%. 
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  Table 2.6: Market Effects of Brazilian Ethanol Production 
 22 billion liters 26 billion liters 30 billion liters 
Percentage with Two-way Trade
1
 0.97 0.88 0.75 
Percentage using both fuels
2
 0.38 0.25 0.05 
Corn Price ($/bushel) 5.64 5.33 5.04 
U.S. Ethanol Plant Price 
($/gallon) 
2.22 2.14 2.06 
Brazil Ethanol Price 
3
($/gallon) 2.59 2.49 2.38 
Soybean Price ($/bushel) 8.71 8.67 8.64 
Soybean Oil Price (cents/pound) 58.2 57.43 56.7 
Soybean Meals Price ($/short ton) 233.84 235.63 237.3 
U.S. Ethanol Production (BG) 16.03 15.4 14.82 
U.S. Ethanol Exports (BG) 1.81 1.18 0.6 
U.S. Ethanol Imports (BG) 1.34 1.41 1.49 
Conventional RIN Price ($/gallon) 0.94 0.86 0.78 
Biodiesel RIN Price ($/gallon) 1.83 1.79 1.77 
Advanced RIN Price ($/gallon) 1.7 1.59 1.48 
Note: All results are reported in the regular units in the market. All RIN prices are in ethanol 
equivalent unit. 1Percentage of observations with the U.S. exporting corn ethanol to Brazil, 
and importing sugarcane ethanol from Brazil simultaneously.2Percentage of observations 
using both sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel to meet the other advanced mandate.3Brazilian 
domestic wholesale anhydrous ethanol price, with exchange rate at 2.05 reals per dollar. 
 
The percentage using both sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel to meet the other 
advanced mandate increases by 13%, and U.S. ethanol imports drop by 0.07BG, which 
implies the shortage of sugarcane ethanol from Brazil makes U.S. biodiesel more competitive 
as the other advanced biofuels. This also confirms that U.S. biodiesel could reduce U.S. 
dependence on imports to meet RFS mandates in some extent. Soybean and soybean oil 
prices increase, while soybean meals price drops. The average conventional RIN price 
increases by 8 cents, with the average advanced RIN price two times of the transportation 
cost more than the conventional RIN price. The effects are inversed for a high level of 
ethanol production in Brazil, shown in Table 2.6. 
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U.S. Corn Yield 
Low corn yield due to bad weather conditions is one of the most important shifter of 
U.S. ethanol supply. We compare the average market results from low, moderate and high 
corn yields
33
, with results reported in Table 2.7. 
When U.S. corn yield is as low as 143.8 bu/ac, only 40% of 100 observations have 
two-way trade between the U.S. and Brazil, with the U.S. exports 0.12 BG corn ethanol to 
Brazil, while imports 1.26 BG sugarcane ethanol from Brazil. The exports decrease by 1.53 
BG from those with the moderate corn yield (162.9 bu/ac). A shortage in corn supply leads to 
a high corn price at $6.83/bushel, and it could go higher if the corn yield further decreases as 
in 2012 that U.S. corn prices goes above $8/bushel with the extreme low corn yield at 122.8 
bu/ac. Comparing with the case with the moderate corn yield, U.S. ethanol production from 
corn decreases by 1.37 BG and U.S. ethanol price drops by 27.8% ($0.55/gallon). Brazilian 
ethanol price also goes up by $0.43/gallon due to the decreased exports of corn ethanol to 
Brazil. 
Poor corn yield also increases the competitiveness of biodiesel as the other advanced 
mandate, 67% of 100 observations use both fuels to meet the other advanced mandate. 
Biodiesel helps meet 0.24 BG of the other advanced mandate, increased from 0.01 BG in the 
moderate corn yield case. Soybean, soybean meals and soybean oil prices all rises due to the 
demand for biodiesel, and also due to the comparatively low soybean yield.
34
 All RINs prices 
increase because of the increased supply prices. 
 
                                                 
33
 We sort our draws by corn yield, then compare the first, middle and last quintiles and report the average 
results. 
34
 As corn and soybean in the U.S. are usually grown in the same area, and then experience the same weather 
conditions. Corn yield and Soybean yield has a positive correlation. We impose the correlation on the draws 
of these two yields. The correlation is derived from the historical data. 
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Table 2.7: Market Effects of U.S. Corn Yield 
U.S. Corn Yield 143.8 bu/ac 162.9 bu/ac 176.3 bu/ac 
Percentage with Two-way Trade
1
 0.4 1 1 
Percentage using both fuels
2
 0.67 0.04 0.09 
Corn Price ($/bushel) 6.83 4.73 4.71 
U.S. Ethanol Plant Price ($/gallon) 2.53 1.98 1.97 
Brazil Ethanol Price 
3
($/gallon) 2.79 2.36 2.35 
Soybean Price ($/bushel) 9.97 8.34 8.15 
Soybean Oil Price (cents/pound) 61.26 56.12 55.93 
Soybean Meals Price ($/short ton) 263.49 229.54 224.09 
U.S. Ethanol Production (BG) 14.32 15.69 15.77 
U.S. Ethanol Exports (BG) 0.12 1.65 1.65 
U.S. Ethanol Imports (BG) 1.26 1.49 1.47 
Conventional RIN Price ($/gallon) 1.22 0.69 0.69 
Biodiesel RIN Price ($/gallon) 1.91 1.73 1.72 
Advanced RIN Price ($/gallon) 1.86 1.45 1.45 
Note: All results are reported in the regular units in the market. All RIN prices are in ethanol 
equivalent unit. 1Percentage of observations with the U.S. exporting corn ethanol to Brazil, 
and importing sugarcane ethanol from Brazil simultaneously.2Percentage of observations 
using both sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel to meet the other advanced mandate.3Brazilian 
domestic wholesale anhydrous ethanol price, with exchange rate at 2.05 reals per dollar. 
 
Conclusions 
In this paper, we construct a stylized trade model between the U.S. and Brazil, and 
illustrate the equilibrium conditions. We apply the RFS biofuels mandates to the U.S. ethanol 
market in our model, and use this policy to understand the competition between corn ethanol 
and Brazilian sugarcane ethanol to meet the conventional RFS mandate and also the 
competition between Brazilian sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel to meet the other advanced 
mandate.  
We then explore the determinations of various RINs prices and the relationship 
between these RIN prices. Starting from a hypothetic case that there is no advanced mandate 
in place, we derive the supply of advanced RINs from sugarcane ethanol. We also get 
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insights of the RINs prices from the ethanol trade pattern between the U.S. and Brazil. Both 
the conventional and advanced RIN prices are non-decreasing with the other advanced 
mandate. With two-way trade between the U.S. and Brazil, the advanced RIN price is two 
times transportation cost more than the conventional RIN price. When the U.S. imports an 
amount of the other advanced mandate, the conventional and advanced RIN price gap is less 
than two times transportation cost. When the U.S. imports more than the other advanced 
mandate, the conventional RIN price equals the advanced RIN price. The model is then 
extended to take into account of U.S. biodiesel as an alternative to meet the other advanced 
mandate, and discuss the possibility to use both biodiesel and sugarcane ethanol to meet the 
other advanced mandate.  
Specifically, with stochastic gasoline prices and feedstock yields from our projected 
distribution, we calibrate the demands and supplies of all related products to solve for market 
clearing prices and quantities for the marketing year 2013/14. The average values are used to 
estimate the impacts of RFS on U.S. biofuels market. Our results consistently show that RFS 
biofuels mandates motivate the two-way trade between the U.S. and Brazil. U.S. biodiesel 
could help meet the other advanced mandate to some extent, but currently still could not 
eliminate U.S. dependence on imported sugarcane ethanol to meet the RFS mandates. 
Variation in U.S. gasoline price, Brazil ethanol production and U.S. corn yield levels would 
change the magnitude of U.S. exports to the Brazil, and also impact the comparative 
competiveness of U.S. biodiesel as the source of the other advanced biofuels. With the 
difficulty to blend more than 10% ethanol into gasoline, the U.S. ethanol demand is very 
inelastic and constrains the impacts of high gasoline price and high corn yield on 
commodities prices. And the RFS mandates also constrain the impacts of downside gasoline 
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price change. With a poor corn yield as in 2012, RFS mandates could help explain the 
increase in all commodities prices and all RIN prices, and the decrease in the U.S. exports of 
corn ethanol. 
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CHAPTER 3.    IMPACT OF WEATHER AND SOIL MOISTURE ON CORN YIELD 
IN THE US MIDWEST 
 
Abstract 
In this study, a linear spline fixed effect model is constructed to estimate the impact 
of climate variables on corn yields by adding in soil moisture as an explanatory variable into 
the corn yield response function. Recent two drought years 2011 and 2012 are included in the 
estimation dataset that facilitates estimation of corn yield response to extreme conditions. 
The daily soil moisture data in the Upper Mississippi River Basin Area from 1980 to 2012 is 
simulated from the crop model EPIC, which has very comprehensive interactions between 
hydrology, weather, soil, nutrients, crop and plant environment controls. Bayesian Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach and Metropolis-Hasting algorithm are applied to 
estimate the two-knot spline models. Our results suggest that the effects of high temperature 
on corn yield should be evaluated together with water availability. The yield reduction from 
high temperature is 15 to 20 percentage points greater under low compared to average water 
availability. With increased spring rainfall projection, it is reasonable to question that 
whether the effects of high temperature have been overlooked in recent studies. Moreover, 
our findings indicate that the determinant factors for corn yield losses vary across the U.S. 
Midwest. Excessive spring rainfall in Iowa and Illinois is damaging to corn yield, however, 
could help reduce yield losses during hot and dry summers through the soil moisture effect. 
In Wisconsin, too little spring rainfall is more damaging than too much. 
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Introduction 
Numerous studies have focused on the impact of climate change on crop yields. Most 
confirm that it can significantly impact the agricultural production, especially focusing on the 
negative effects of high temperature (Schlenker and Roberts 2006, 2009, Hatfield et al. 2011, 
Lobell et al. 2013). A shortage of agricultural supply then has the potential to push up the 
food and fuel prices, and may even trigger food crisis and social problems in some poor 
countries. In 2012, extreme heat and lack of precipitation sharply decreased the corn and 
soybean productions in the United States, which accounts for about 40% of the world’s corn 
production. Together with the demand from biofuels industry, the average corn price in the 
marketing year 2012/13 was pushed up to about $7.8/bushel, with U.S. corn exports 
decreased by 40% comparing with 2010/11. Future globe warming could further exaggerate 
this situation (Lobell et al. 2011). Thus, it is imperative to clearly understand how climate 
change would impact the crop yields.  
Most studies of the crop yield response to the climate change use econometric 
regression models to identify the effects of temperature and precipitation on crop yields from 
historical data. Using panel data of corn yield, temperature, and precipitation from 1950 to 
2004 in 2000 counties of the U.S., Schlenker and Roberts (2006) find that corn yields are 
increasing in temperature for moderate temperature, but significantly decreasing once 
temperature exceeds 30°C.Yu and Babcock (2011) estimate impacts of both rainfall and 
temperature on corn yields across states in the U.S. Corn Belt by fitting a linear spline model 
with endogenous thresholds to avoid the symmetric restriction of quadratic functional form. 
However, studies consider soil moisture factors are limited. Exceptional increase in rainfall 
in the U.S. Midwest (Kunkel et al. 2013, Anderson et al. 2013) makes it more important to 
52 
 
consider the soil moisture effect to project the climate impact on corn yield. Several studies 
use a number of soil quality variables as controls in their regression equations (Schlenker et 
al. 2006, Deschenes and Greenstone 2007). With data from 1954 to 1988 in central Iowa, 
Carlson (1990) includes July 1
st
 and August 1
st
 plant-available soil moisture variables into his 
linear regression model, and finds significant positive correlations with corn yields. Roberts 
et al. (2012) includes the vapor pressure deficit derived from temperatures into their 
regression, which is closely related to relative humidity, and influences evapotranspiration 
and soil moisture. 
Our study estimates the corn yield response function by adding soil moisture as an 
explanatory variable. Soil moisture reflects the long-run accumulated soil water storage for 
crops and the information of the initial state of the soil water condition. During periods of 
high temperature, more soil moisture may help resist the drought and moderate potential 
damages, while less soil moisture can exaggerate the damaging effects and induce more yield 
losses. Daily soil moisture data in the Upper Mississippi River Basin area (UMRB, Figure 
3.1)
35
from 1980 to 2012 is simulated from crop model Environmental Policy Integrated 
Climate (EPIC).These models usually have comprehensive theory background, and are 
constructed to include the interactions of hydrology, weather, soil, nutrients and plant 
environment controls. Izaurralde et al. (2003) assess the impact of future climate change on 
U.S. corn and wheat yields by simulations using the Environmental Policy Integrated Climate 
(EPIC) model (Williams, 1995). The widely used drought indices Soil Moisture Deficit Index 
(SMDI) and Evapotranspiration Deficit Index (ETDI) are derived in Narasimhan and 
Srinivasan (2005) based respectively on weekly soil moisture deficit and evapotranspiration 
                                                 
35
 Upper Mississippi River Basin includes large parts of Illinois (85 counties), Iowa (76 counties), Minnesota 
(72 counties), Missouri (37 counties), and Wisconsin (55 counties), and small areas in Indiana (13 counties), 
Michigan (1 county), and South Dakota (6 counties). 
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deficit using the distributed hydrologic model Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT). 
These models are also widely used to simulate the impacts of projected climate change and 
the benefits and costs of alternative environmental policies (Thomson et al. 2002, Feng et al. 
2007).  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Upper Mississippi River Basin 
Source: Feng et al. 2007 
 
Recent two drought years 2011 and 2012 are included in the estimation dataset to 
facilitate estimation of corn yield response to extreme conditions. Bayesian Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo approach in Yu and Babcock (2010) is applied to estimate the parameters and 
the thresholds of the two-knot spline yield response functions simultaneously. Our results 
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suggest that the effects of high temperature on corn yield should be evaluated together with 
water availability. The yield reduction from high temperature is 15 to 20 percentage points 
greater under low compared to average water availability. With increased spring rainfall 
projection, it is reasonable to question that whether the effects of high temperature have been 
overstated in recent studies. Soil water availability could play an important role and it could 
not be reasonably described using growth season precipitation only. Moreover, our findings 
indicate that the determinant factors for corn yield losses vary across the U.S. Midwest. 
Excessive spring rainfall in Iowa and Illinois is damaging to corn yield, however, could help 
reduce yield losses during hot and dry summers through the soil moisture effect. In 
Wisconsin, too little spring rainfall is more damaging than too much. 
Data 
In this study, we estimate the impacts of temperature, precipitation and soil moisture 
on corn yield. The data is a balanced panel of counties across major states in the Upper 
Mississippi River Basin ranging from 1980 to 2012. We have a total of 8547 observations 
including 2508 from 76 Iowa counties, 2508 from 76 Illinois counties, 2013 from 61 
Minnesota counties, and 1518 from 46 Wisconsin counties. All counties with yield data in all 
years from 1980 to 2012 are included.
36
 Counties in UMRB rely mainly on rainfall for soil 
moisture, which helps to focus on the weather and soil moisture impacts. 
Corn yield is constructed as corn production divided by planted acres. County-level 
corn production and planted acreage data is collected from the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA-NASS).  
                                                 
36
 There are 9 counties in Illinois with missing corn yield data, 11 in Minnesota, 14 in Missouri, and 9 in 
Wisconsin. 
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We use the same 1/8 degree gridded daily data for the maximum temperature, 
minimum temperature and precipitation as in Maurer et al. (2002)
37
, and extend it to span the 
period 1979-2012.The soil moisture data is simulated using the EPIC model, version 1102-64 
(Izaurralde et al. 2006).
38
 EPIC simulations are carried out at a field-scale level for areas 
homogeneous in weather, soil, land-scape, crop rotation, and management system parameters 
using a continuous daily time step for 34 years from 1979 to 2012. The Natural Resource 
Inventory database provides information on the natural resource characteristics of the 
landscape, soil, crop rotation and other input data for the simulations. The daily maximum 
and minimum temperatures and precipitation data is used as weather inputs in EPIC. Each 
field in EPIC runs is matched with the nearest 1/8
th
 degree weather grid point. The simulated 
data for 1979 is omitted to minimize the starting effects. 
In our regression, we include May to August as corn growth season. Because extreme 
heat always happens in July and August and water requirement for corn growth in July and 
August is higher than in May and June (Evans et al. 1996), we divide the growth season into 
two time intervals May to June (MJ, planting and early vegetative growth) and July to 
August (JA, pollination and grain fill).Daily maximum and minimum temperatures, 
precipitation and root zone soil water content for each field are averaged for each time 
interval. The arithmetic mean of the maximum and minimum temperatures is used as the 
average temperature. The area-weighted average over all fields within a county is constructed 
to obtain county-level data. 
                                                 
37
 In Maurer et al. (2002), daily precipitation totals from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
Cooperative Observer (Co-op) stations were assigned to each day based on the time observation for the 
gauge. The precipitation gauge data were gridded to the 1/8 resolution using the synergraphic mapping 
system algorithm. The gridded daily precipitation data were then scaled to match the long-term average of 
the Parameter-elevation Regressions on Independent Slopes Model (PRISM) precipitation climatology. The 
minimum and maximum daily temperature data from Co-op stations were gridded using the same algorithm 
as for precipitation, and were lapsed to the grid cell mean elevation. 
38
 Additional information concerning EPIC can be found in Gassman et al. 2004. 
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The mean and standard errors of corn yield, temperature, precipitation, and soil 
moisture for Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are summarized in Table 3.1. The 
temperature in July and August is about 4°C higher than in May and June. And the soil 
moisture in July and August is much lower than that in May and June. Iowa and Illinois have 
more spring rainfall compared to Minnesota and Wisconsin. Soil moisture reservoir is 
deepest in Illinois, slightly less in Iowa, and substantially less in Minnesota and Wisconsin. 
 
Table 3.1: Yield, Weather and Soil Moisture Statistical Mean and Standard Errors 
 Illinois Iowa Minnesota Wisconsin 
Number of Observation 2508 2508 2013 1518 
Corn Yield (bushels per planted acre) 130.81 133.04 116.54 94.44 
 (33.45) (31.88) (37.11) (28) 
Temperature in May and June (°C) 19.66 18.30 16.81 16.34 
 (1.53) (1.33) (1.43) (1.30) 
Temperature in July and August (°C) 23.86 22.63 21.28 20.90 
 (1.63) (1.53) (1.37) (1.41) 
Precipitation in May and June (mm) 3.59 3.91 3.28 3.34 
 (1.46) (1.52) (1.16) (1.29) 
Precipitation in July and August (mm) 3.08 3.59 3.24 3.48 
 (1.23) (1.59) (1.15) (1.19) 
Soil Moisture on May 1
st
(mm) 210.16 171.27 142.87 145.52 
 (39.11) (45.45) (48.28) (38.00) 
Soil Moisture on July 1
st
(mm) 144.56 124.59 105.74 97.95 
 (45.29) (53.69) (51.34) (41.35) 
 Note: Standard errors are in the parenthesis. 
 
The Model 
Impacts of weather and soil water on corn yield for major states in UMRB are 
estimated individually. We are following Yu and Babcock (2010) to use two-knot spline 
yield response functions and Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach to estimate the 
parameters and thresholds simultaneously. This method captures the nonlinear and 
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asymmetric features of weather impacts on corn yield and has the advantage of high 
computational efficiency. 
Log corn yield is specified to be composed of a linear trend and two-knot spline 
functions of temperature, precipitation and soil moisture variables. In our regression models, 
we have the average daily temperature, and precipitation across May to June, and July to 
August and also May 1
st
 and July 1
st
 soil moisture variables.  
The Control Model 
The control model only includes the two most frequently used weather variables 
temperature and precipitation so that it is comparable with existing literatures and also could 
be the base case for us to study the role of soil moisture in response to corn yield. The control 
model is as follows: 
100 ∗ log⁡(𝑌𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
 + ∑ (𝛽𝑇,1
𝑗 min⁡(0, 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑗 ) + 𝛽𝑇,2
𝑗 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛽𝑇,3
𝑗 max⁡(0, 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑗 ))
𝑗=𝑀𝐽,𝐽𝐴
 
 +⁡ ∑ (𝛽𝑃,1
𝑗 min⁡(0, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑗 ) + 𝛽𝑃,2
𝑗 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛽𝑃,3
𝑗 max⁡(0, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑗 ))
𝑗=𝑀𝐽,𝐽𝐴
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
Subscripts i, t denote county and year, respectively. j represents different time 
interval, either May to June or June to August. Y denotes corn yield. Year is the time trend 
variable. T and P represent the average temperature and precipitation. αi is the county fixed-
effect parameter, which absorbs all unobserved time-invariant and county-specific 
determinants of corn yield. Tlow and Thigh are the low and high thresholds that divide the 
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average temperature into three ranges, Plow and Phigh for the average precipitation. These 
thresholds are estimated together with the coefficients α and β.  
The percentage marginal effects of the average temperature and precipitation are 
measured as follows: 
𝛽𝑇,𝑠
𝑗 =
{
  
 
  
 
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
 
𝛽𝑇,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑗 = 𝛽𝑇,1
𝑗 + 𝛽𝑇,2
𝑗
 if⁡⁡⁡𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 ⁡≤ 𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑗
 
𝛽𝑇,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑗 = 𝛽𝑇,2
𝑗
 if⁡⁡⁡𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑗 ≤ 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 ⁡≤ 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑗
 
𝛽𝑇,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑗 = 𝛽𝑇,2
𝑗 + 𝛽𝑇,3
𝑗
 if⁡⁡⁡𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 ⁡≥ 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑗
 
𝛽𝑃,𝑠
𝑗 =
{
  
 
  
 
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
 
𝛽𝑃,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑗 = 𝛽𝑃,1
𝑗 + 𝛽𝑃,2
𝑗
 if⁡⁡⁡𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 ⁡≤ 𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑗
 
𝛽𝑃,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑗 = 𝛽𝑃,2
𝑗
 if⁡⁡⁡𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑗 ≤ 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 ⁡≤ 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑗
 
𝛽𝑃,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑗 = 𝛽𝑃,2
𝑗 + 𝛽𝑃,3
𝑗
 if⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 ⁡≥ 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑗
 
Subscript s denotes the state of the weather condition, where βT,low (βP,low) represents 
the marginal effects of average temperature (precipitation) when the temperature 
(precipitation) falls below the lower threshold, βT,med (βP,med) for the range between the lower 
and upper thresholds, βT,high (βP,high) for the range above the upper threshold. This model 
specification allows the weather effects to vary with the weather conditions, which shows the 
nonlinear and asymmetric impacts of weather variables and also improves the model 
interpretability.
39
 One degree increase in summer temperature might result in more damages 
to corn yield in drought years than in cool years. 
 
 
                                                 
39
 The variable mean may not necessarily fall between the two thresholds. 
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The Dry-Hot Model 
The Dry-Hot model adds the two-knot spline functions of May 1
st
 and July 1
st
 soil 
moisture. Moreover, to illustrate the soil moisture effect of water availability on yield losses 
from heat, we also incorporate the interactions of July-August high heat, July-August low 
precipitation and July 1
st
 low soil moisture. The model is as follows: 
100 ∗ log⁡(𝑌𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
 + ∑ (𝛽𝑇,1
𝑗 min⁡(0, 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑗 ) + 𝛽𝑇,2
𝑗 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛽𝑇,3
𝑗 max⁡(0, 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑗 ))
𝑗=𝑀𝐽,𝐽𝐴
 
 +⁡ ∑ (𝛽𝑃,1
𝑗 min⁡(0, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑗 ) + 𝛽𝑃,2
𝑗 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛽𝑃,3
𝑗 max⁡(0, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑗 ))
𝑗=𝑀𝐽,𝐽𝐴
 
 +⁡ ∑ (𝛽𝑆,1
𝑗 min⁡(0, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑗 ) + 𝛽𝑆,2
𝑗 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛽𝑆,3
𝑗 max⁡(0, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
𝑗=𝑀𝑎𝑦1,𝐽𝑢𝑙1
− 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑗 )) 
 +⁡𝛽𝑇𝑃
𝐽𝐴max(0, 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 − 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴 ) ∗ min⁡(0, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 − 𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴 ) 
 +⁡𝛽𝑇𝑆
𝐽𝐴max(0, 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 − 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴 ) ∗ min⁡(0, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝑢𝑙⁡1 − 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝑢𝑙⁡1) 
 +⁡𝛽𝑃𝑆
𝐽𝐴min⁡(0, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 − 𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴 ) ∗ ⁡min⁡(0, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝑢𝑙⁡1 − 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝑢𝑙⁡1) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
S denotes soil moisture in the root zone, with two thresholds Slow and Shigh. For May-
June temperature and precipitation and May 1
st
 soil moisture, the percentage marginal 
impacts are similar as the control model. With the interaction terms, the percentage marginal 
effects of July-August temperature and precipitation and July 1
st
 soil moisture are conditional 
on all three variables. For example, one degree increase in summer temperature could result 
in different amount of change in corn yield in dry years than in normal or wet years; more 
rainfall might be more helpful when soil water availability is limited than abundant. 
Specifically, 
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𝛽𝑇,𝑠
𝐽𝐴 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
 
𝛽𝑇,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴 = 𝛽𝑇,1
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽𝑇,2
𝐽𝐴
 if⁡⁡⁡𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 ⁡≤ 𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴
 
𝛽𝑇,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝐽𝐴 = 𝛽𝑇,2
𝐽𝐴
 if⁡⁡𝑇𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴 ≤ 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 ⁡≤ 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴
 
𝛽𝑇,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴 = 𝛽𝑇,2
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽𝑇,3
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽𝑇𝑅
𝐽𝐴 ∗ min(0, 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 − 𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴 )
+ 𝛽𝑇𝑆
𝐽𝐴 ∗ min⁡(0, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝑢𝑙⁡1 − 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝑢𝑙⁡1) 
if⁡⁡⁡𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 ⁡≥ 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴
 
𝛽𝑃,𝑠
𝐽𝐴 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
 
𝛽𝑃,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴 = 𝛽𝑃,1
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽𝑃,2
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽𝑇𝑃
𝐽𝐴 ∗ max(0, 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 − 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴 )
+ 𝛽𝑃𝑆
𝐽𝐴 ∗ min⁡(0, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝑢𝑙⁡1 − 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝑢𝑙⁡1) 
if⁡⁡⁡𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 ⁡≤ 𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴
 
𝛽𝑃,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝐽𝐴 = 𝛽𝑃,2
𝐽𝐴
 if⁡⁡𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴 ≤ 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 ⁡≤ 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴
 
𝛽𝑃,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴 = 𝛽𝑃,2
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽𝑃,3
𝐽𝐴
 if⁡⁡⁡𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 ⁡≥ 𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴
 
𝛽𝑆,𝑠
𝐽𝐴 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
⁡
 
𝛽𝑆,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 = 𝛽𝑆,1
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 + 𝛽𝑆,2
𝐽𝑢𝑙1
+ 𝛽𝑇𝑆
𝐽𝐴 ∗ max(0, 𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 − 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴 ) + 𝛽𝑃𝑆
𝐽𝐴
∗ ⁡min⁡(0, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝐴 − 𝑃𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴 ) 
if⁡⁡⁡𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 ⁡≤ 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝑢𝑙1
 
𝛽𝑆,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 = 𝛽𝑆,2
𝐽𝑢𝑙1
 if⁡⁡𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 ≤ 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 ⁡≤ 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝑢𝑙1
 
𝛽𝑆,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 = 𝛽𝑆,2
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 + 𝛽𝑆,3
𝐽𝑢𝑙1
 if⁡⁡⁡𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 ⁡≥ 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝑢𝑙1
 
 
Estimation Results 
We followed Yu and Babcock (2010) to use Bayesian approach to estimate the 
parameters and thresholds simultaneously. 20,000 iterations are simulated with the first 5000 
as the burn-in period. The mean and the standard deviation of the posterior distributions are 
calculated based on the 15,000 draws for each parameter.  
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Results for the Control Model 
Table 3.2 presents the posterior mean and standard deviation of the parameters of the 
control model. The linear trend estimates are all positive and statistically significant in all 
four states, ranging from 1.34% increase in corn yield per year in Illinois to as high as 2.1% 
increase per year in Minnesota. Table 3.3 shows the lower and upper thresholds for all four 
weather variables across the four states. 
For each weather variable, the first coefficient measures the difference between the 
percentage marginal impact on corn yield when it is below the lower threshold and the 
percentage marginal impact when it is between the two threshold; the third is the difference 
between the percentage marginal impact on corn yield when it is between the two threshold 
and the marginal impact when it is above the threshold. To better illustrate the percentage 
marginal impact of weather variables on corn yield. Using the 15,000 draws of the 
coefficients, we simulate the percentage impact of each variable. The mean and standard 
deviation are illustrated in Table 3.4.  
𝛽𝑇,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴
, 𝛽𝑇,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴
, 𝛽𝑃,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑀𝐽
, 𝛽𝑃,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑀𝐽
and 𝛽𝑃,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴
 are statistically significant across all four 
states. The percentage marginal impact of July-August temperature is negative in Iowa and 
Illinois and positive in Wisconsin and Minnesota, which might be explained by the spatial 
variation in temperature. Historical average July-August temperature in Iowa and Illinois is 
at least 1.4°C higher than in Minnesota and Wisconsin. The marginal impacts of July-August 
temperature almost all become negative when the temperature increases above the lower 
threshold. And the impact magnitudes increase significantly when July-August temperature 
is over the upper threshold, which indicates additional heat in July-August is more harmful 
for corn yield in dry summer than in normal condition. When above the upper threshold, one 
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Table 3.2: Posterior Mean and Standard Deviation of Coefficients of the Control Model 
 Illinois Iowa Minnesota Wisconsin 
𝛽0 1.34* 1.47* 2.10* 1.53* 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
𝛽𝑇,1
𝑀𝐽
 7.30 7.08* 8.42* 8.17* 
 (3.84) (2.97) (1.42) (2.64) 
𝛽𝑇,2
𝑀𝐽
 -5.96 -1.51 -2.88* -0.94 
 (4.12) (4.00) (1.24) (2.64) 
𝛽𝑇,3
𝑀𝐽
 13.95* -1.24 -10.82* -4.35 
 (6.58) (5.06) (3.45) (4.27) 
𝛽𝑇,1
𝐽𝐴
 5.81* 6.61* 9.68* 15.14* 
 (0.94) (0.88) (3.08) (3.35) 
𝛽𝑇,2
𝐽𝐴
 -10.62* -9.10* -1.21 -3.71* 
 (0.89) (0.69) (0.70) (0.77) 
𝛽𝑇,3
𝐽𝐴
 -21.23* -20.30* -11.67* -9.42* 
 (2.41) (1.93) (1.75) (1.94) 
𝛽𝑃,1
𝑀𝐽
 10.30 15.26* 20.45* 28.27* 
 (5.17) (3.24) (5.76) (3.81) 
𝛽𝑃,1
𝑀𝐽
 1.38 3.78* -3.82* 3.57 
 (6.02) (0.89) (1.18) (3.71) 
𝛽𝑃,1
𝑀𝐽
 -3.72 -10.97* -26.24* -10.73* 
 (6.74) (0.89) (2.99) (3.41) 
𝛽𝑃,1
𝐽𝐴
 7.69* 5.82* 7.38 7.53 
 (3.37) (1.44) (4.09) (5.12) 
𝛽𝑃,2
𝐽𝐴
 4.42 2.46* -0.88 4.16 
 (3.10) (1.23) (4.00) (4.76) 
𝛽𝑃,3
𝐽𝐴
 -5.07 -14.88* 0.26 -3.70 
 (3.00) (1.37) (4.52) (4.85) 
Note: Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Asterisk (*) denotes estimates significant at 5%. 
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degree increase in July-August temperature results in about 30% corn yield losses in Illinois 
and Iowa and about 13% in Minnesota and Wisconsin.  
 
Table 3.3: Estimated Thresholds of the Control Model 
 Illinois Iowa Minnesota Wisconsin 
Lower threshold of May-June Temperature 
TTtemTtTemperature 
21.11 17.93 16.98 16.05 
Upper threshold of May-June Temperature 22.17 19.50 19.22 17.81 
Lower threshold of July-August Temperature 23.46 22.57 18.91 18.54 
Upper threshold of July-August Temperature 26.05 24.98 22.2 21.84 
Lower threshold of May-June Precipitation 2.48 1.74 2.48 2.30 
Upper threshold of May-June Precipitation 4.12 4.02 5.2 3.55 
Lower threshold of July-August Precipitation 2.76 3.33 2.87 3.41 
Upper threshold of July-August Precipitation 3.89 5.30 3.94 4.36 
 
The marginal impacts of May-June and July-August precipitation are all positive 
when they are below the lower thresholds, which indicates that drought in the growing 
seasons is always harmful for corn growth. When May-June precipitation is below the lower 
threshold, one millimeter per day decrease in precipitation will lead to about 12% yield 
losses in Illinois, 19% in Iowa, 17% in Minnesota and 32% in Wisconsin. It is similar in July 
and August. When July-August precipitation is below the lower threshold, one millimeter 
decrease per day in precipitation will decrease corn yield by about 12% in Illinois, 8% in 
Iowa, 7% in Minnesota and 12% in Wisconsin. The lower thresholds are almost all between 
the mean and one standard deviation below mean, which are not extreme low levels. The 
significantly negative marginal impact of high May-June precipitation indicates that too 
much water in the planting and early vegetative growing period is harmful. The results of the 
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control model are very consistent with existing literatures so that it could be used as a base 
model for our soil moisture impact analysis. 
 
Table 3.4: Percentage Marginal Effects of Weather Variables in the Control Model 
 Illinois Iowa Minnesota Wisconsin 
𝛽𝑇,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑀𝐽
 1.34 5.56 5.53* 7.24* 
 (0.76) (2.95) (1.02) (2.70) 
𝛽𝑇,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑀𝐽
 -5.96 -1.51 -2.88* -0.94 
 (4.12) (4.00) (1.24) (2.64) 
𝛽𝑇,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑀𝐽
 7.99* -2.76 -13.70* -5.28 
 (3.28) (1.66) (2.94) (3.13) 
𝛽𝑇,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴
 -4.81* -2.49* 8.47* 11.43* 
 (0.79) (0.50) (2.78) (3.15) 
𝛽𝑇,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝐽𝐴
 -10.62* -9.10* -1.21 -3.71* 
 (0.89) (0.69) (0.70) (0.77) 
𝛽𝑇,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴
 -31.84* -29.40* -12.88* -13.13* 
 (2.42) (1.72) (1.65) (1.83) 
𝛽𝑃,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑀𝐽
 11.69* 19.04* 16.63* 31.84* 
 (3.92) (2.98) (6.49) (3.32) 
𝛽𝑃,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑀𝐽
 1.38 3.78* -3.82* 3.57 
 (6.02) (0.89) (1.18) (3.71) 
𝛽𝑃,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑀𝐽
 -2.34* -7.19* -30.06* -7.16* 
 (1.16) (0.64) (2.53) (1.14) 
𝛽𝑃,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴
 12.10* 8.28* 6.50* 11.69* 
 (1.19) (0.93) (2.63) (1.89) 
𝛽𝑃,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝐽𝐴
 4.42 2.46* -0.88 4.16 
 (3.10) (1.23) (4.00) (4.76) 
𝛽𝑃,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴
 -0.66 -12.42* -0.62 0.46 
 (1.15) (0.76) (1.31) (1.42) 
Note: Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Asterisk (*) denotes estimates significant at 5%. 
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Results for the Dry-Hot Model 
Including May 1st and July 1st soil moisture variables and the interaction terms 
improves the fit of the control model. The value of adjusted-R
2
 increases by 0.02 in 
Minnesota and up to 0.07 in Iowa. F tests with null hypothesis that these two models have the 
same effect are all significantly rejected. Table 3.5 presents the posterior mean and standard 
deviation of coefficients of the Dry-Hot model. Coefficients of the trend variable remain 
positive and statistically significant and increase by 0.07 in Iowa and 0.05 in Wisconsin. 
 
Table 3.5: Posterior Mean and Standard Deviation of Coefficients of the Dry-Hot 
Model 
 Illinois Iowa Minnesota Wisconsin 
𝛽0 1.35* 1.56* 2.10* 1.6* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
𝛽𝑇,1
𝑀𝐽
 9.23*  7.98* 0.03 9.45* 
 (4.19) (2.09) (10.95) (3.47) 
𝛽𝑇,2
𝑀𝐽
 -5.63 1.1 0.89 1.52 
 (4.16) (1.95) (6.65) (2.82) 
𝛽𝑇,3
𝑀𝐽
 17.51* 0.43 -3.19 1.31 
 (6.61) (3.91) (8.10) (3.79) 
𝛽𝑇,1
𝐽𝐴
 5.67* 3.1 9.79* 15.23* 
 (1.00) (1.85) (3.18) (3.15) 
𝛽𝑇,2
𝐽𝐴
 -8.54* -6.44* -1.47* -2.25* 
 (0.50) (1.70) (0.70) (0.74) 
𝛽𝑇,3
𝐽𝐴
 -1.14 14.85* -6.13* 3.16 
 (3.23) (3.95) (1.86) (2.03) 
𝛽𝑃,1
𝑀𝐽
 7.00 17.62* 12.06* 18.63* 
 (4.17) (3.34) (2.15) (4.76) 
𝛽𝑃,2
𝑀𝐽
 -2.61 1.90* -2.48* 1.67 
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Table 3.5 Continued 
 (4.22) (0.86) (1.09) (4.45) 
𝛽𝑃,3
𝑀𝐽
 -0.16 -7.85* -24.56* -8.92* 
 (5.03) (0.86) (2.84) (4.28) 
𝛽𝑃,1
𝐽𝐴
 3.94 10.59* 1.40 6.14 
 (3.39) (3.54) (6.52) (4.01) 
𝛽𝑃,2
𝐽𝐴
 -0.34 -15.37* 4.58 -1.29 
 (3.23) (3.45) (2.47) (3.75) 
𝛽𝑃,3
𝐽𝐴
 1.14 6.06 -5.18* -0.11 
 (3.63) (3.79) (2.58) (4.27) 
𝛽𝑆,1
𝑀𝑎𝑦1
 1.089 1.206 0.822 -0.253 
 (0.905) (1.801) (1.148) (0.972) 
𝛽𝑆,2
𝑀𝑎𝑦1
 -1.180 -1.226 -0.789 0.037 
 (0.902) (1.802) (1.145) (0.886) 
𝛽𝑆,3
𝑀𝑎𝑦1
 1.358 1.199 0.753 -0.189 
 (0.910) (1.811) (1.144) (0.909) 
𝛽𝑆,1
𝐽𝑢𝑙1
 0.935 2.193* 0.390* 3.599 
 (1.781) (0.927) (0.130) (2.793) 
𝛽𝑆,2
𝐽𝑢𝑙1
 -0.852 -2.372* -0.092* -3.520 
 (1.775) (0.927) (0.030) (2.787) 
𝛽𝑆,3
𝐽𝑢𝑙1
 0.836 2.491* -0.296* 3.507 
 (1.798) (0.926) (0.129) (2.794) 
𝛽𝑇𝑃
𝐽𝐴
 8.984* 6.751* 3.043 8.407* 
 (1.266) (0.764) (6.859) (1.432) 
𝛽𝑇𝑆
𝐽𝐴
 0.133* 0.086* 0.541* 0.248* 
 (0.033) (0.013) (0.124) (0.036) 
𝛽𝑃𝑆
𝐽𝐴
 -0.193* -0.102* -2.350 -0.112* 
 (0.019) (0.005) (1.822) (0.027) 
Note: Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Asterisk (*) denotes estimates significant at 5%. 
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Since Dry-Hot model only includes the interactions of July-August temperature, July-
August precipitation and July 1st soil moisture, the percentage marginal effects of May-June 
temperature, May-June precipitation and May 1st soil moisture are estimated in the same way 
as the control model. The mean and standard deviation are shown in Table 3.6. For May-June 
temperature, the coefficients are still consistent with the control model in Illinois, Iowa and 
Wisconsin. Warm weather is beneficial for corn growth in the early stage, especially in cool 
spring years. For Illinois and Iowa, this beneficial effect becomes much more significant in 
the Dry-Hot model might due to the high soil moisture in Illinois and decrease in the lower 
threshold in Iowa as shown in Table 3.7. May-June precipitation coefficients are consistent 
with the control model across all four states with the same signs and significance levels. But 
most of the impact magnitudes become smaller in 𝛽𝑃,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑀𝐽
, with the most decrease  
by 10 percent points in Wisconsin. May 1st soil moisture is insignificant in almost all four 
states. 
With the interaction terms, the interpretation of July-August temperature, 
precipitation and July 1
st
 soil moisture impacts becomes more complicated. But it is still 
comparable with the control model when July-August temperature is below the upper 
threshold or July-August precipitation and July 1
st
 soil moisture are above the lower 
threshold as shown in Table 3.8. When July-August temperature is below the upper 
threshold, the coefficients are very consistent with the control model, even though the 
thresholds are lower in the Dry-Hot model in Illinois and Iowa. The conditional high July-
August temperature even has positive marginal impact might result from few observations of 
hot but wet summers in Iowa. When July-August precipitation is above the lower threshold, 
precipitation impacts remain insignificant in Illinois and Minnesota. 𝛽𝑃,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝐽𝐴
 becomes 
68 
 
significantly negative in Iowa. This big change is because the two thresholds are too close 
and one knot specification gives similar and a little flatter prediction without the jump. The 
large marginal impact of July 1
st
 soil moisture between the two thresholds in Iowa is also due 
to too close thresholds. Except for Minnesota, July 1
st
 soil moisture marginal impacts are all 
insignificant in Illinois, Iowa and Wisconsin. But for Minnesota, excessive moisture is the 
dominant factor for yield losses. 
 
Table 3.6: Percentage Marginal Effects of May-June Temperature, Precipitation and 
May 1st Soil Moisture in the Dry-Hot Model 
 Illinois Iowa Minnesota Wisconsin 
𝛽𝑇,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑀𝐽
 3.59* 9.09* 0.92 10.97* 
 (0.44) (1.97) (4.8) (2.98) 
𝛽𝑇,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑀𝐽
 -5.63 1.10 0.89 1.52 
 (4.16) (1.95) (6.65) (2.82) 
𝛽𝑇,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑀𝐽
 11.88* 1.53 -2.3 2.82 
 (3.22) (2.52) (2.48) (2.27) 
𝛽𝑃,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑀𝐽
 4.39* 19.51* 9.58* 20.30* 
 (1.84) (3.11) (2.18) (2.35) 
𝛽𝑃,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑀𝐽
 -2.61 1.90* -2.48* 1.67 
 (4.22) (0.86) (1.09) (4.45) 
𝛽𝑃,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑀𝐽
 -2.78* -5.96* -27.03* -7.25* 
 (1.32) (0.60) (2.49) (0.93) 
𝛽𝑆,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑀𝑎𝑦1
 -0.090* -0.021 0.033 -0.216 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.048) (0.200) 
𝛽𝑆,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝑀𝑎𝑦1
 -1.180 -1.226 -0.789 0.037 
 (0.902) (1.802) (1.145) (0.886) 
𝛽𝑆,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝑀𝑎𝑦1
 0.179 -0.027 -0.037 -0.152 
 (0.192) (0.041) (0.131) (0.127) 
Note: Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Asterisk (*) denotes estimates significant at 5%. 
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Table 3.7: Estimated Thresholds of the Dry-Hot Model 
 Illinois Iowa Minnesota Wisconsin 
Lower threshold of May-June Temperature 
TTtemTtTemperature 
21.51 17.40 16.05 15.33 
Upper threshold of May-June Temperature 22.19 19.45 17.69 17.03 
Lower threshold of July-August Temperature 22.58 22.17 18.91 18.52 
Upper threshold of July-August Temperature 25.70 23.70 22.16 21.41 
Lower threshold of May-June Precipitation 2.69 1.62 2.82 2.45 
Upper threshold of May-June Precipitation 4.45 4.04 5.23 3.28 
Lower threshold of July-August Precipitation 3.70 5.51 1.86 3.98 
Upper threshold of July-August Precipitation 4.52 6.13 3.21 4.68 
Lower threshold of May 1
st
 Soil Moisture 
TTtemTtTemperature 
231.74 172.49 171.59 143.20 
Upper threshold of May 1
st
 Soil Moisture 245.53 181.18 192.48 169.71 
Lower threshold of July 1
st
 Soil Moisture 146.68 198.06 42.71 113.20 
Upper threshold of July 1
st
 Soil Moisture 170.82 200.32 177.93 114.97 
 
It is notable that the coefficients of the interaction terms are all statistically significant 
in Illinois, Iowa and Wisconsin as shown in the last three rows of Table 3.5. The coefficients 
of the interaction term of high July-August temperature and low July-August precipitation 
and the interaction of high July-August temperature and low July 1
st
 soil moisture are 
significantly positive, which indicate that in drought condition, one degree increase in 
temperature results in more yield losses when there is less water availability. Water 
availability could help reduce yield losses in drought years. The coefficients of the 
interaction of low July-August precipitation and low July 1
st
 soil moisture are significantly 
negative. This shows when there is more soil moisture in the ground, the marginal impact of 
precipitation would be smaller. Soil moisture and precipitation could be substitutes to some 
extent. 
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Table 3.8: Percentage Marginal Effects of July-August Temperature, Precipitation and 
July 1st Soil Moisture in the Dry-Hot Model 
 Illinois Iowa Minnesota Wisconsin 
𝛽𝑇,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴
 -2.88* -3.34* 8.32* 12.98* 
 (0.95) (0.73) (2.87) (2.94) 
𝛽𝑇,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝐽𝐴
 -8.54* -6.44* -1.47* -2.25* 
 (0.5) (1.70) (0.70) (0.74) 
𝛽𝑇,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴 #
 -9.68* 8.41* -7.61* 0.91 
 (3.15) (2.74) (1.58) (1.78) 
𝛽𝑃,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴 #
 3.60* -4.78* 5.98 4.85* 
 (0.67) (0.62) (5.50) (1.20) 
𝛽𝑃,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝐽𝐴
 -0.34 -15.37* 4.58 -1.29 
 (3.23) (3.45) (2.47) (3.75) 
𝛽𝑃,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴
 -1.48 -9.30* -0.60 -1.40 
 (1.10) (0.86) 0.86) (1.43) 
𝛽𝑆,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦1#
 -0.083* -0.178* 0.297* 0.080 
 (0.032) (0.020) (0.137) (0.049) 
𝛽𝑆,𝑚𝑒𝑑
𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦1
 -0.852 -2.372* -0.093* -3.519 
 (0.902) (0.927) (0.030) (2.787) 
𝛽𝑆,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦1
 0.179 0.120 -0.389* -0.012 
 (0.192) (0.074) (0.131) (0.050) 
Note: Standard errors are in the parenthesis. Asterisk (*) denotes estimates significant at 5%. 
#
 means they are conditional marginal impacts. 𝛽𝑇,ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
𝐽𝐴 #
 is the marginal impact when July-
August precipitation and July 1
st
 soil moisture are above their lower thresholds. 𝛽𝑃,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝐴 #
 is the 
marginal impact when July-August temperature is below the upper threshold and July 1
st
 soil 
moisture is above the lower threshold. 𝛽𝑆,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦1#
 is the marginal impact when July-August 
temperature is below the upper threshold and July-August precipitation is above the lower 
threshold. 
 
To better illustrate the impact of water availability on the yield effects of high July-
August temperature, we calculate the marginal effect of high July-August temperature under 
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different July-August precipitation and July 1
st
 soil moisture conditions using the 15,000 
simulations of parameters. The average marginal effects are shown in Table 3.9. Minnesota is 
excluded due to limited high temperature effects. 
 
Table 3.9: Percentage Marginal Effects of High July-August Temperature under 
Different July-August Precipitation and July 1
st
 Soil Moisture Conditions 
July 1
st
 Soil Moisture Jul-Aug Precipitation Illinois Iowa Wisconsin 
µ µ -15.57 -10.89 -6.88 
µ-σ µ -21.50 -15.52 -17.16 
µ µ-σ -26.62 -21.62 -16.80 
µ-σ µ-σ -32.54 -26.25 -27.07 
Note: µ denotes the historical mean of the variable in the column. σ is the corresponding 
standard deviation. 
 
 The first row shows the yield losses due to high July-August temperature when July-
August precipitation and July 1
st
 soil moisture are both at historical mean levels. The last row 
shows the yield losses when July-August precipitation and July 1
st
 soil moisture are both at 
one standard deviation below mean. If both July-August precipitation and July 1
st
 soil 
moisture move from one standard deviation below mean to mean level, yield losses from 
high July-August temperature decrease from 32.54% to 15.57% in Illinois, 26.25% to 
10.89% in Iowa and 27.07% to 6.88% in Wisconsin. This indicates that soil moisture and 
rainfall could reduce yield losses from hot summer. Without considering the soil moisture 
conditions, the feared yield losses from high temperature might be overstated, especially 
when high temperature is accompanied with increased soil moisture. Moreover, one standard 
deviation increase in July-August precipitation reduces more yield losses from high July-
August temperature than one standard deviation increase in July 1
st
 soil moisture in Illinois 
72 
 
and Iowa. The impact is about the same in Wisconsin. For example in Illinois, when July-
August precipitation is at mean, increasing July 1
st
 soil moisture from one standard deviation 
below mean to mean reduces yield losses by about 6 percent points. But when July 1
st
 soil 
moisture is at mean, increasing July-August precipitation from one standard deviation below 
mean to mean reduces yield losses by over 10 percent points. 
 Similarly, when July-August temperature is high, the percentage marginal effect of 
low July-August precipitation decreases from 12.75% to 4.01% if July 1
st
 soil moisture 
increase from one standard deviation from mean to mean in Illinois, from 8.19% to 2.71% in 
Iowa and from 11.19% to 6.56% in Wisconsin. Precipitation has a larger impact on corn 
yield when soil moisture is low in the summer. This clearly shows the substitution between 
July 1
st
 soil moisture and July-August precipitation.  
Illustration Using 1980-1992 and 2000-2012 
Studies show that increase of greenhouse gases has accelerated the increase of 
precipitation since 1990s and hot and dry summer is less frequent in recent years. (Kunkel et 
al. 2013, Janssen et al. 2014) When high temperature is accompanied with high precipitation 
and high soil moisture, yield losses might be much less than predicted without taking into 
account of water availability. For simplicity, we use our existing dataset to show the impact 
of this climate shift. 
We take two periods 1980-1992 and 2000-2012 from our dataset for Illinois, Iowa 
and Wisconsin.
40
 The mean value of each variable for each period is shown in Table 3.10 
with the p-value for the test that the mean value is different between the two periods. May-
Jun precipitation and July 1
st
 soil moisture increased significantly in 2000-2012, which is 
                                                 
40
 Minnesota is excluded due to limited high temperature effects. 
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consistent with existing literatures that annual rainfall increased since 1990s and was driven 
by warm season rainfall. (Kunkel et al. 2013) Moreover, May-June temperature significantly 
decreased in the later period in Iowa and Wisconsin. 
 
Table 3.10: Mean of Each Predictor for Periods 1980-1992 and 2000-2012 
 
Jul-Aug 
Precipitation 
µ 
T
MJ
 P
MJ
 
µ-σ 
S
May1
 T
JA
 P
JA
 S
Jul1
 
Illinois       
1980-1992 19.71 3.16 206.2 23.83 3.09 132.6 
2000-2012 19.76 3.71 207.6 23.94 3.16 142.3 
p-value 0.41 0 0.41 0.13 0.22 0 
Iowa       
1980-1992 18.65 3.39 171.2 22.76 3.57 108.5 
2000-2012 18.17 4.12 165.2 22.61 3.60 122.1 
p-value 0 0 0 0.03 0.74 0 
Wisconsin       
1980-1992 16.55 2.82 145.0 20.90 3.54 90.2 
2000-2012 16.17 3.69 142.4 21.00 3.33 97.6 
p-value 0 0 0.25 0.15 0 0 
 
 
We evaluate the average yield given the variables taking values at the mean of each 
period. And derive the yield change by subtracting estimated yield in 1980-1992 from yield 
in 2000-2012. The total yield change is presented in the second column of Table 3.11. Corn 
yield slightly decreased in Illinois by 1.97 bushels/acre and increased by 2.33 bushels/acre in 
Iowa. The change is more substantial in Wisconsin by 6.12 bushels/acre. Columns 3 to 8 of 
Table 3.11 show the contribution of each variable to this yield change. 
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In Illinois and Wisconsin, the primary driver of the yield reduction is increased May-
June precipitation (-4.22 bushels/acre in Illinois, -4.34 bushels/acre in Wisconsin). In Illinois, 
this yield reduction is offset by yield increase from higher July 1
st
 soil moisture. This benefit 
is smaller in Wisconsin. And the yield reduction is exaggerated by yield losses from lower 
July-August precipitation. The yield change in Iowa is modest with the primary yield 
increase from higher July-August temperature. 
 
Table 3.11: Mean Yield Change when Variables Change from Mean Values of 1980-
1992 to Mean Values of 2000-2012 
 
Jul-Aug 
Precipitation 
µ 
Total T
MJ
 P
MJ
 
µ-σ 
S
May1
 T
JA
 P
JA
 S
Jul1
 
Illinois -1.97 0.31 -4.22 -0.22 -1.64 0.77 3.35 
Iowa 2.33 -0.70 0.58 0.41 1.64 -0.17 0.51 
Wisconsin -6.12 -0.86 -4.34 0.38 -0.30 -2.59 1.28 
 
 
To illustrate the yield change under extreme conditions, we take the subset of 
observations with July-August temperature above the upper threshold from each period and 
calculate the variable means as shown in Table 3.12. In Illinois and Iowa, July-August 
temperature decreased significantly which is consistent with the evidence of fewer drought 
incidences in recent years. Same as the average case, May-June precipitation and July 1
st
 soil 
moisture are higher in 1990-2012. And July-August precipitation also increased in Illinois 
and Iowa.  
The yield change of the two subsets from periods 1980-1992 and 2000-2012 is 
presented in Table 3.13. Comparing with the period average case, the yield change is more 
substantial under high temperature condition. Yield reduction decreased significantly in 
Illinois and Iowa (23.32 bushels/acre in Illinois, 25.31 bushels/acre in Iowa). In Illinois and 
75 
 
Iowa, the reduction in yield losses is due to lower July-August temperature, higher July-
August precipitation and more July 1
st
 soil moisture. In Wisconsin, the yield loss reduction is 
much smaller, mainly due to more July 1
st
 soil moisture. The contribution of July-August 
rainfall and July 1
st
 soil moisture is less than July-August temperature but still substantial and 
cannot be neglected. 
 
Table 3.12: Mean of Each Predictor for Periods 1980-1992 and 2000-2012 when July-
August Temperature Is Above the Upper Threshold  
 
Jul-Aug 
Precipitation 
µ 
T
MJ
 P
MJ
 
µ-σ 
S
May1
 T
JA
 P
JA
 S
Jul1
 
Illinois       
1980-1992 20.42 2.74 229.2 26.62 2.10 116.6 
2000-2012 21.51 3.51 222.1 26.32 2.44 127.8 
p-value 0 0 0.08 0 0 0.06 
Iowa       
1980-1992 19.42 3.12 171.5 24.92 2.87 101.8 
2000-2012 19.28 4.18 175.6 24.42 3.53 118.2 
p-value 0.27 0 0.47 0 0 0 
Wisconsin       
1980-1992 17.20 2.52 151.3 22.41 3.60 86.6 
2000-2012 16.79 3.42 150.3 22.18 3.58 96.9 
p-value 0 0 0.8 0 0.91 0 
 
 
Table 3.13: Mean Yield Change when Variables Change from Mean Values of 1980-
1992 to Mean Values of 2000-2012 when July-August Temperature Is Above the Upper 
Threshold 
 
Jul-Aug 
Precipitation 
µ 
Total T
MJ
 P
MJ
 
µ-σ 
S
May1
 T
JA
 P
JA
 S
Jul1
 
Illinois 23.32 3.98 -2.03 0.68 9.09 6.09 6.13 
Iowa 25.31 0.02 0.77 -0.17 12.63 11.90 4.47 
Wisconsin 4.71 -0.81 -0.98 0.12 2.60 -0.28 4.77 
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Conclusion 
We construct a log yield response function with two-knot linear spline functions of 
temperature, precipitation variables and also the interactions of high heat and low 
precipitation and low soil moisture terms. Bayesian Monte Carlo approach is applied to 
estimate the parameters and thresholds simultaneously using a balanced panel dataset from 
1980 to 2012 over the Upper Mississippi River Basin. Our results show that the impact of 
high temperature on corn yield cannot be estimated without taking into account the water 
availability. Yield losses from high July-August temperature reduced by 15 to 20 percentage 
points under average water availability than under low water availability. Soil water 
availability could play an important role and it could not be reasonably described using 
growth season precipitation only. July 1
st
 soil moisture and July-August precipitation are 
substitutes. But one standard deviation increase in precipitation reduces more yield losses 
from high temperature than one standard deviation increase in soil moisture. 
Moreover, our findings indicate that the determinant factors for corn yield losses vary 
across the U.S. Midwest. Excessive spring rainfall in Iowa and Illinois is damaging to corn 
yield, however, could help reduce yield losses during hot and dry summers through the soil 
moisture effect. In Wisconsin, too little spring rainfall is more damaging than too much. 
We also illustrate the possible climate shift impact on corn yield using the historical 
periods’ average values of weather and soil moisture variables. The data shows high heat and 
low water availability are less frequent in the later period. More May-June precipitation 
increases yield losses but offsets by the increase in July 1
st
 soil moisture. Under average 
weather conditions, the change in yield is modest. But under hot condition, yield losses 
decrease significantly due to cool weather and more water availability. However, using a 
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more reliable source of climate projections would give a better picture of the yield impact 
than using historical data. 
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CHAPTER 4.   CORN YIELD SENSITIVITY CHANGE TO DROUGHT 
CONDITIONS SINCE 1980 
 
Abstract 
We construct yield response functions to allow the yield deviation driven by 
weather variables to change over time. The model is estimated using a balanced panel 
dataset for from 1980 to 2012, including two recent drought years 2011 and 2012 with 
more drought incidences in the modern eras. Then we test the hypotheses that the 
marginal and total impacts of weather variables remain constant under our hypothetical 
drought weather conditions. Our results show that yield losses due to drought conditions 
increases over time in absolute yield terms but remains constant in percentage terms due to 
increase in base yield over time. Corn yield is becoming less sensitive to July-August 
precipitation which reduces yield losses under modest drought level. Yield losses from one 
degree increase in July-August temperature increase since 1980 in bushels per acre but 
remains constant in percentage. July-August precipitation marginal impact decreases over 
time in percentage terms because corn yield is becoming less sensitive to summer 
precipitation and precipitation is also becoming less helpful to reduce yield losses from high 
heat over time. The substitution effect between July-August precipitation and July 1
st
 soil 
moisture is greater since 1980. Beside of the substitution effect, the marginal impact of July 
1
st
 soil moisture is unchanged. 
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Introduction 
 Numerous studies have focused on the impacts of weather conditions in the growing 
season on corn yield, especially the impact of growing spring rainfall, high temperature and 
limited water availability in the summer. However, there are still debates on whether the 
impact of weather conditions is constant or changing over time. And few observations of dry 
and hot summer conditions during 1990-2010 make the previous results less convincing. 
Moreover, the sensitivity of corn yield to weather condition has an important implication on 
the determination of premium rates for crop insurance. Risk Management Agency (RMA) 
uses the actual corn yield history to determine their crop insurance guarantees, which cannot 
differentiate the impact of few drought events and increased yield sensitivity to adverse 
weather conditions in an increased corn yield record. So it is imperative to have a clear 
understanding of the evolving impact of weather on corn yield. In this chapter, we investigate 
the impact of weather conditions on corn yield allowing the weather effects to change with 
time. And then test the hypothesis that the total and marginal effects remain constant over 
time in both absolute and percentage terms. 
 The weather impact on corn yield is well studied. Their results show that moderate 
heat is beneficial to corn growth but when the temperature is above some threshold yield 
declines sharply, and an increase in precipitation benefits corn yield but is harmful when it is 
too much (Lobell and Asner, 2003; Schlenker and Roberts, 2006; Deschenes and Greenstone, 
2007; Yu and Babcock, 2011). For example, using panel data of corn yield, temperature, and 
precipitation from 1950 to 2004 in 2000 counties of the U.S., Schlenker and Roberts (2006) 
finds that corn yields are increasing in temperature for moderate temperature, but 
significantly decreasing once temperature exceeds 30°C.Yu and Babcock (2011) shows 
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concave relationship between corn yield and rainfall and temperature across states in the U.S. 
Corn Belt by fitting a linear spline model with endogenous thresholds. But they all use 
constant trend effect which is not flexible to take into consider change in weather impact 
over time. 
Unlike the consistency in the weather impacts on corn yield in existing literatures, 
there are debates on the research about the changing impact of weather conditions especially 
drought on corn yield over time. By constructing a drought index capturing the presence of 
both unusually hot and unusually dry conditions, Yu and Babcock (2010) indicates that corn 
has indeed become more drought tolerant since 1980 in terms of both bushels and percentage 
losses. On the other hand, comparing the results of cross-sectional and time series regression 
analysis for period from 1950 to 2005, Schlenker and Roberts (2009) states weather impacts 
don't change over time and there is little adaption to weather changes. But too few drought 
events after 1990 make their results less convincing. And the drought in 2011 and 2012 
provides us more observations to compare the weather impact between the modern eras with 
1980s. Using field data on maize and soybean in the central U.S. for 1995-2012, Lobell, et al. 
(2014) concludes that drought sensitivity in maize, in particular sensitivity to high vapor 
pressure deficits (VPD), has steadily increased over the period from 1995-2012, although 
yields have increased in yield value under all levels of stress for both crops. In this chapter, 
we revisit the model of Yu and Babcock (2010) and show the result changes due to including 
two recent drought year observations, using the county-level weather and corn yield data 
from 1980 to 2012 in Iowa and Illinois. We then construct corn yield response functions with 
the flexibility allowing the weather impact to change over time and test the hypotheses that 
the marginal and total weather impacts on corn yield remain constant over time since 1980 
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under our hypothetical adverse weather conditions, especially for July-August temperature, 
July-August precipitation and July 1
st
 soil moisture. The weather impact on corn yield in 
1980 is consistent with the results in Chapter 3. Our results show that yield losses due to 
drought conditions increase over time in absolute yield terms but remain constant in 
percentage terms due to increase in base yield over time. Corn yield is becoming less 
sensitive to July-August precipitation which reduces yield losses under modest drought level.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in section 2 we describe the dataset 
we use in this study. We revisit the existing literature using our dataset and compare the 
results in section 3. In section 4, we construct a yield response function with the flexibility to 
allow weather impact on corn yield to change over time and present the estimated result. The 
hypothesis that marginal impact of weather variables on corn yield is constant over time is 
tested in section 5. Section 6 explores the change in the total weather impact on corn yield. In 
the last section, a general conclusion is presented. 
Data Selection 
In this study, we estimate the changing impacts of temperature, precipitation and soil 
moisture on corn yield over time. We use the same 1/8 degree gridded daily data for the 
maximum temperature, minimum temperature and precipitation as in Maurer et al. (2002),
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and extend it to span the period 1979-2012. All counties in Iowa and Illinois with yield data 
in all years from 1980 to 2012 are included.
42
 
                                                 
41
 In Maurer et al. (2002), daily precipitation totals from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
Cooperative Observer (Co-op) stations were assigned to each day based on the time observation for the 
gauge. The precipitation gauge data were gridded to the 1/8 resolution using the synergraphic mapping 
system algorithm. The gridded daily precipitation data were then scaled to match the long-term average of 
the Parameter-elevation Regressions on Independent Slopes Model (PRISM) precipitation climatology. The 
minimum and maximum daily temperature data from Co-op stations were gridded using the same algorithm 
as for precipitation, and were lapsed to the grid cell mean elevation. 
42
 There are 9 counties in Illinois with missing corn yield data. 
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Corn and soybean yields are constructed as production divided by planted acres. 
County-level production and planted acreage data is collected from the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA-NASS).  
The soil moisture data is simulated using the EPIC model, version 1102-64 
(Izaurralde et al. 2006).
43
 EPIC simulations are carried out at a field-scale level for areas 
homogeneous in weather, soil, land-scape, crop rotation, and management system parameters 
using a continuous daily time step for 34 years from 1979 to 2012. The Natural Resource 
Inventory database provides information on the natural resource characteristics of the 
landscape, soil, crop rotation and other input data for the simulations. The daily maximum 
and minimum temperatures and precipitation data is used as weather inputs in EPIC. Each 
field in EPIC runs is matched with the nearest 1/8th degree weather grid point. The simulated 
data for 1979 is omitted to minimize the starting effects. 
In our regression, we include May to August as corn growth season. We divide the 
growth season into two time intervals May to June (MJ, planting and early vegetative 
growth) and July to August (JA, pollination and grain fill). Daily maximum and minimum 
temperatures, precipitation and soil moisture for each field are averaged for each time 
interval. The arithmetic mean of the maximum and minimum temperatures is used as the 
average temperature. The area-weighted average over all fields within a county is constructed 
to obtain county-level data. 
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 Additional information concerning EPIC can be found in Gassman et al. 2004. 
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Revisit Previous Study 
In order to see the impact of including more drought events in the modern eras, we 
revisit the model in Yu and Babcock (2010) estimating their model and also estimate their 
model using our dataset including data from 1980-2012. 
They define a drought index (DI) as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = −max⁡(0, 𝐶𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑) ∗ min⁡(0, 𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑) (4.1) 
Where CLDD and TPCP are standardized average cooling degree days and total monthly 
precipitation with i and t as the county and year index. Their model is specified as: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛼𝑖 +∑𝛾𝑟(𝐶𝑅𝐷𝑟 ∗ 𝑇) +
𝑅
𝑟=1
𝛽𝑑𝑖𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ⁡
+ ⁡𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑞𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑞𝑡𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑄𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
(4.2) 
Where t, i and r denote time, county and crop reporting districts (CRDs), respectively. R is 
the number of crop reporting districts. Y denotes crop yield. 𝛼𝑖 is the county-specific fixed 
effect parameter. T is a trend variable taking values 0 to 32 for years 1980 to 2012. DIT = 
DI* T, DISQ = DI *DI, DISQT = DI * DI * Q. 
We first apply their data selection criteria on our dataset for the same period as their 
study to guarantee the weather data is consistent. By choosing only those counties in CRDs 
that have at least two drought incidents with an index larger than 2 or at least three drought 
incidents with an index larger than 1.5 since 2000, we get the same number of CRDs as their 
paper. But we don’t have weather data for Indiana. Our estimation and hypothesis tests 
results are also very consistent. Corn yield losses from mild and moderate drought have 
decreased over time in both absolute and percentage terms.  
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Then we use the dataset from 1980 to 2012 with the same data selection criteria to 
estimate the model. The resulted data includes 1 more CRD in Illinois and 3 more CRDs in 
Iowa due to the recent drought years 2011 and 2012. The coefficients of DIT, DISQ and 
DISQT are quite different in both signs and statistical significance. And we fail to reject the 
hypothesis that corn yield losses remain constant under moderate drought condition in both 
absolute and percentage terms. Yield losses increase over time in bushels but remain constant 
in percentage. Also the marginal yield losses from drought also increase over time. This 
comparison provides evidence that two few drought incidents in the modern eras and without 
considering the soil moisture level before drought make the result less convincing. We then 
construct a model using the weather variables directly rather than using the drought index. 
This can differentiate the impact of individual weather variables and also test the total yield 
deviation due to weather. 
The Model 
The soil moisture data is only available for the Upper Mississippi River Basin Area, 
which includes 76 counties in Illinois, 76 counties in Iowa, 61 counties in Minnesota and 46 
counties in Wisconsin. Since there are even fewer drought conditions in Minnesota and 
Wisconsin, we only use data for Iowa and Illinois counties in the UMRB and estimate our 
model by pooling Iowa and Illinois together. So we have a balanced panel dataset with 5016 
observations. 
We construct corn yield to be composed of county-specific fixed effect parameter, a 
deterministic time trend variable, function of weather variables and interactions of time trend 
with weather variables to allow weather impact to change over time. Specifically, 
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𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽𝑤 ∗ 𝑓(𝑊𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑤𝑇 ∗ 𝑓(𝑊𝑖,𝑡) ∗ 𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖 (4.3) 
𝑓(𝑊) = 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐽 + (𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐽)2 + 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 + (𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴)2 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑀𝐽  
 +(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑀𝐽)2 + 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 + (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴)2 + 𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑦1 + (𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑦1)2  
 +𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 + (𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1)2 + 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 + 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1  
 +𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1  
Y represents corn yield. 𝛼𝑖 is the fixed effect parameter which absorbs time-invariant and 
county-specific determinants of corn yield. T is time trend variable taking values of 0 to 32 
for years 1980 to 2012. Temp and Prep denote the average temperature and precipitation 
across the indexed period, respectively. MJ and JA are the period indices for May-June and 
July-August. SM denotes soil moisture on May 1st or July 1st.  𝛽0, 𝛽𝑤 and 𝛽𝑤𝑇 are 
coefficients to be estimated. 𝜀𝑖 is the error term.  
All weather variables are re-centered to have zero mean by subtracting the historical 
mean from each observation. When all weather variables take values at their historical mean 
levels, 𝛼𝑖 measures the average corn yield for county i in 1980. 𝛽0 measures a deterministic 
trend yield due to factors not related to weather conditions. It is assumed to be constant 
across all the counties. The function of weather variables 𝑓(𝑊𝑖,𝑡) is specified as the sum of 
quadratic functions of all the weather variables and also includes the interactions of July-
August temperature, precipitation and July 1st soil moisture to take into account of the soil 
moisture effect on corn yield and yield trend.  
Without the interaction terms with time trend, it illustrates the weather impact in 
1980. Interaction term of weather and time trend variable 𝑓(𝑊𝑖,𝑡) ∗ 𝑇 gives the model the 
flexibility to capture the possible changes in weather impact on corn yield over time. 
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Moreover, the quadratic and interaction terms of weather variables allow the marginal impact 
of weather variables to vary for different weather conditions.  
In order to minimize the parameters to be estimated and keep significant factors in the 
yield response function, we selectively add and remove terms so that to minimize Bayesian 
information criteria (BIC). The resulting model is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0 ∗ 𝑇⁡+⁡𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝑀𝐽 ⁡+ 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽3 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝑀𝐽)2 (4.4) 
 +𝛽4 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽5 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴)2 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑆𝑀
𝑀𝑎𝑦1 + 𝛽7 ∗ (𝑆𝑀
𝐽𝑢𝑙1)2  
 +𝛽8 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1  
 +𝛽10 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝑀𝐽 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽12 ∗ (𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴)2 ∗ 𝑇  
 +𝛽13 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴)2 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽14 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖  
The stepwise-BIC approach only keeps the interaction of time trend with May-June 
temperature, July-August temperature and precipitation, and July 1
st
 soil moisture. May 1st 
soil moisture or May-June precipitation impact on corn yield per year only changes through 
the soil moisture impact of July 1st soil moisture. The model specification is straightforward 
to test whether weather impact on corn yield measured in bushels per acre has varied over 
time.  
To investigate the percentage impact of weather variables and also to test whether the 
percent yield impact of weather variables has changed over time, we have 100*log(Y) on the 
left-hand side of the regression function. So the coefficients present the percent yield change 
due to changes in the predictors. Using the same selection method, the model is specified as 
in equation (4.5). Here, b's are the parameters to be estimated as β's in model (4.4). 𝛾𝑖 is the 
corresponding county-specific fixed effect parameters. 
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100 ∗ log⁡(𝑌𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛾𝑖+⁡𝑏0 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝑏1 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝑀𝐽 + 𝑏2 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 (4.5) 
 +𝑏3 ∗ (𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴)2 + 𝑏4 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝑀𝐽 + 𝑏5 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝑀𝐽)
2
  
 +𝑏6 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝑏7 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴)2 + 𝑏8 ∗ 𝑆𝑀
𝑀𝑎𝑦1  
 +𝑏9 ∗ 𝑆𝑀
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 + 𝑏10 ∗ (𝑆𝑀
𝐽𝑢𝑙1)2 + 𝑏11 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴  
 +𝑏12 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 + 𝑏13 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1  
 +𝑏14 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝑀𝐽 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝑏15 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑇  
 +𝑏16 ∗ (𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴)2 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝑏17 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴)2 ∗ 𝑇  
 +𝑏18 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑇  
 +𝜀𝑖  
The error term absorbs the impact of all other yield determinants. It could be 
heteroskedastic and serial correlated among counties or over time. The coefficients are still 
consistent with the presence of heteroskedastic but the standard errors are underestimated. 
The null hypotheses that the estimated variance of residuals from our fixed effect models is 
equal across all counties are rejected at the 1% significance level using Breusch-Pagan test 
(Breusch and Pagan, 1979). The null hypotheses that there are no serial correlations in the 
error terms are also significantly rejected using Breusch-Godfrey test (Godfrey, 1978). 
Arellano type variance matrix is adopted to obtain the standard errors, which are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation for fixed number of years and large number of 
observations. (Arellano, 1987) 
Estimation Results 
Models (4.4) and (4.5) are estimated using the panel data of county-level corn yield, 
average temperature, precipitation in May-June and July-August and soil moisture on May 
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1st and July 1st. Table 4.1 provides coefficients estimates and robust standard errors for all 
selected variables in model (4.4). All coefficients are significant at 5% significance level. 
 
   Table 4.1: Estimates and Robust Standard Errors of Yield Model 
 Estimates Standard Errors 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 114.27 (2.58) 
𝑇 2.00 (0.04) 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐽 3.82 (0.50) 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 -8.69 (0.28) 
(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑀𝐽)2 -1.47 (0.11) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 5.41 (0.30) 
(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴)2 -1.78 (0.14) 
𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑦1 -0.0239 (0.0078) 
(𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1)2 -0.0007 (0.0001) 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 1.35 (0.16) 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 0.0312 (0.0045) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 -0.0377 (0.0077) 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐽 ∗ 𝑇 -0.15 (0.03) 
(𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴)2 ∗ 𝑇 -0.05 (0.01) 
(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴)2 ∗ 𝑇 0.03 (0.01) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 ∗ 𝑇 -0.0018 (0.0004) 
   Note: Coefficients and standard errors for soil moisture variables are  
   rounded to four decimal places and others are rounded to two. All  
   coefficients are statistically significant at 5%. 
 
The intercept is a proxy of the average yield in 1980 given all weather variables 
taking values at their historical mean. It is estimated to be around 114 bushels per acre. The 
deterministic trend due to factors other than weather variables is significantly positive around 
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2 bushels per acre per year. Terms without interaction with time trend variable give an 
estimate of the weather impact in 1980.  
The coefficient of May-June temperature is significantly positive. Warm spring is 
generally beneficial for corn growth. On the contrary, summer heat incurs yield losses. Given 
July-August precipitation and July 1st soil moisture at historical mean levels, one Celsius 
degree increase in July-August temperature will lead to 8.69 bushels yield losses. But 
increase in July-August precipitation or July 1st soil moisture will help reduce yield losses 
from high heat, which is consistent with the result in Chapter 3. For example, one standard 
deviation increase in July-August precipitation reduce yield losses from one degree increase 
in temperature by 1.95 bushels per acre; one standard deviation increase in July 1st soil 
moisture reduce yield losses by 1.58 bushels per acre, which is a little less than the impact 
from one standard deviation increase in precipitation. Above average May-June precipitation 
is harmful. Too much water in the planting period might delay the planting and be harmful 
for root development. This is similar for May 1st soil moisture. Assuming July-August 
temperature and July 1st soil moisture take their historical mean values, corn yield increases 
when July-August precipitation is1.52mm/day above its historical mean and decreases for 
higher values. Increase in July-August temperature increases the marginal impact of 
precipitation also extends the threshold to a higher value. Summer precipitation is more 
helpful in a wider range in hot summer. More July 1st soil moisture works in an opposite way 
as increase in July-August temperature due to the substitution effect. The impact of July 1st 
soil moisture is similar as July-August precipitation. All the results are generally consistent 
with Chapter 3. The potential change in the weather impacts on corn yield will be discussed 
in the next section. 
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Table 4.2: Estimates and Robust Standard Errors of Log-Yield Model 
 Estimates Standard Errors 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 477.28 (2.37) 
𝑇 1.46 (0.04) 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐽 5.01 (0.51) 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 -9.78 (0.42) 
(𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴)2 -0.73 (0.16) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑀𝐽 -1.21 (0.14) 
(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑀𝐽)2 -1.20 (0.11) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 4.56 (0.28) 
(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴)2 -1.67 (0.15) 
𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑦1 -0.0684 (0.0103) 
𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 0.0819 (0.0130) 
(𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1)2 -0.0006 (0.0001) 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 2.33 (0.33) 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 0.0418 (0.0058) 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 -0.0604 (0.0040) 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐽 ∗ 𝑇 -0.19 (0.03) 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑇 0.10 (0.02) 
(𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴)2 ∗ 𝑇 -0.03 (0.01) 
(𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴)2 ∗ 𝑇 0.03 (0.01) 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑇 -0.05 (0.02) 
   Note: Coefficients and standard errors for soil moisture variables are  
   rounded to four decimal places and others are rounded to two. All  
   coefficients are statistically significant at 5%. 
 
Table 4.2 illustrates the estimates and robust standard errors of Log-Yield Model. All 
coefficients are still significant at 5%. Given the percent yield variation, more variables are 
determined to be relevant. The estimated average corn yield in 1980 is around 118 bushels 
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per acre with a deterministic 1.46% trend per year. The impacts of the weather variables are 
similar to the result of the Yield Model. As a baseline in 1980, increase in May-June 
temperature benefits yield; too much water in May-June is harmful for corn growth; July-
August temperature, precipitation and July 1st soil moisture all have a concave relationship 
with corn yield. One degree increase in July-August temperature reduces corn yield by 
9.78% at round the historical mean temperature and the losses increase as the temperature 
increases, given average water availability. When July-August precipitation or July 1st soil 
moisture move from the historical mean to one standard deviation below the mean, the 
marginal yield losses for temperature around the mean are about 13% and 12%, respectively. 
July-August precipitation benefits corn yield in percentage up to 1.5mm/day above its 
historical mean. At historical mean, 1mm/day increase in precipitation increases corn yield 
by 4.56%. When July 1st soil moisture is one standard deviation below its historical mean, 
the marginal impact of precipitation increases to 7.62% due to the substitution effect. July 1st 
soil moisture increases yield when it is below 119mm, given July-August temperature and 
precipitation at mean values. 
Terms without interaction with time trend variable provide a picture of the weather 
impacts in 1980. It is straightforward to use the estimation of the interactions terms with time 
trend to test whether the marginal and total impacts have changed over time in both absolute 
and percentage terms. 
Marginal Impact of Weather Variables 
Our model specification allows us to investigate the yield deviation driven by weather 
variables and also the change in the weather impacts over time. In the estimation results 
section, we discuss the baseline weather impact in 1980. This section we concentrate on 
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weather variables that might have changing impact on corn yield. The marginal impact of 
weather variables and the change in the marginal impact can be expressed as linear functions 
of the model parameters. And due to the quadratic and interaction terms, the marginal impact 
might also depend on the variable itself and other weather variables. 
Table 4.3 provides the reduced forms of the marginal effects of May-June 
temperature, July-August temperature, July-August precipitation and July 1st soil moisture in 
absolute terms. Based on the linear expressions shown in table 4.3, one can test the 
hypothesis that the marginal effects of these variables are constant over time. 
For May-June temperature, the marginal benefit is decreasing over time since 𝛽11 is 
significantly negative. So on average the effect of May-June temperature is not very 
significant. 
For July-August temperature, the expression shows that 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴
 decreases as 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 
and 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1decreases below the mean (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 < 0, 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 < 0⁡) since the two coefficients 
are significantly positive. This indicates that water availability reduces the marginal yield 
losses due to high heat, on the other hand, dry weather condition exaggerate the damages of 
high heat in the summer. Change of the impact of July-August temperature is dependent on 
itself. When temperature is above the historical mean (𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 > 0), the yield losses due to 
one degree increase in the July-August temperature increases over time since 𝛽12 < 0. 
Moreover, the increase speed is higher for higher temperature. Yield is becoming more and 
more sensitive to high heat. This is consistent with Lobel et al. (2014) that yield sensitivity to 
high heat has steadily increased and more severe under more adverse conditions. As the 
major factor that incurs corn yield losses, it is reasonable to doubt that the drought impact has 
decreased over time. 
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Table 4.3: Marginal Effects of Weather Variables of Yield Model and Their Change 
Over Time 
Variables Expressions 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐽 𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐽
=⁡ 𝛽1 + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝑇 
𝜕2𝑌
𝜕𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐽𝜕𝑇
= 𝛽11 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴
= 𝛽2 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑆𝑀
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 + 2 ∗ 𝛽12 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑇 
𝜕2𝑌
𝜕𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴𝜕𝑇
= 2 ∗ 𝛽12 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴
= 
𝛽4 + 2 ∗ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑆𝑀
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 
+2 ∗ 𝛽13 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝛽14 ∗ 𝑆𝑀
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 ∗ 𝑇 
𝜕2𝑌
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴𝜕𝑇
= 2 ∗ 𝛽13 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽14 ∗ 𝑆𝑀
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 
𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1
= 
2 ∗ 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑆𝑀
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 
+𝛽14 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑇 
𝜕2𝑌
𝜕𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1𝜕𝑇
= 𝛽14 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 
 
For July-August precipitation, the marginal impact depends on itself, July-August 
temperature and also July 1st soil moisture through the substitution effect. Marginal impact 
of precipitation through reducing yield losses from high heat is discussed previously. We 
now focus on the interaction between precipitation and soil moisture. First we consider that 
when July 1st soil moisture is at the historical mean level, the marginal effect decreases over 
time when precipitation is below average since 𝛽13 > 0. But on the other hand, corn yield 
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increases with July-August precipitation when it is below the threshold −
𝛽4
2∗(𝛽5+𝛽13∗𝑇)
. So the 
threshold increases over time. The marginal effect of July-August precipitation decreases 
over time when it is below average and precipitation benefits corn yield in a wider range. 
Increase in July-August temperature also extends the range in which more precipitation is 
beneficial for corn yield. Then we consider when July 1st soil moisture is below the average. 
We put our focus on the impact of drought weather conditions. Beneficial conditions have 
the opposite impact as the adverse condition. When soil moisture is below average, the 
marginal effect of precipitation increases over time since 𝛽14 < 0. The threshold also 
increases as July 1st soil moisture decreases below average. This indicates comparing with 
average soil moisture condition, decrease in precipitation incur more yield losses in a wider 
range under limited soil moisture environment.  
For July 1st soil moisture, it increases yield when it is below average with other 
variables at mean. High temperature and low precipitation can increase this threshold. The 
marginal effect doesn't change over time when July-August precipitation remains at mean. 
However, when precipitation is below average, one mm/day decrease in soil moisture lead to 
more yield losses over time. 
Table 4.4 illustrates the expressions of the marginal effects of May-June temperature, 
July-August temperature and precipitation in percentage points. The marginal effect of May-
June temperature is similar as in the Yield model using bushels per acre. 
For average July-August temperature (𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 = 0), the average marginal 
percentage impact is 𝑏2 + 𝑏15 ∗ 𝑇 with 𝑏2 = −9.78 and 𝑏15 = 0.1. So yield losses due to 
average heat decrease over time. Similar as the Yield model, increase in the water availability 
in the summer reduces percentage yield losses resulting from high heat since 𝑏11 and  𝑏12 are 
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all positive. This benefit from July-August precipitation is decreasing over time because the 
coefficient of 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑇 is significantly negative. For high July-August 
temperature (𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 > 0), this declining trend decreases as temperature increases and it 
reaches zero when 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 = −⁡
𝑏15
2∗𝑏16
= 1.67, given average July-August precipitation. For 
extreme heat, the percentage yield losses might increase over time. This is somehow 
consistent with our result using the model in Yu and Babcock (2010) that the percentage 
yield losses under modest drought reduce over time but failed to reject the constant 
sensitivity null hypothesis under moderate and extreme drought conditions. 
 
Table 4.4: Marginal Effects of Weather Variables of Log-Yield Model and Their 
Change Over Time 
Variable
s 
Expressions 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐽 𝜕100 ∗ log⁡(𝑌)
𝜕𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐽
=⁡ 𝑏1 + 𝑏14 ∗ 𝑇 
𝜕2100 ∗ log⁡(𝑌)
𝜕𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐽𝜕𝑇
= 𝑏14 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 𝜕100 ∗ log⁡(𝑌)
𝜕𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴
= 
𝑏2 + ⁡2 ∗ 𝑏3 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝑏11 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝑏12 ∗ 𝑆𝑀
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 
+𝑏15 ∗ 𝑇 + 2 ∗ 𝑏16 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝑏18 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑇 
𝜕2100 ∗ log⁡(𝑌)
𝜕𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴𝜕𝑇
= 𝑏15 + 2 ∗ 𝑏16 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝑏18 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 𝜕100 ∗ log⁡(𝑌)
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴
= 
𝑏6 + 2 ∗ 𝑏7 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝑏11 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝑏13 ∗ 𝑆𝑀
𝐽𝑢𝑙1 
+2 ∗ 𝑏17 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑇 + 𝑏18 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑇 
𝜕2100 ∗ log⁡(𝑌)
𝜕𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴𝜕𝑇
= 2 ∗ 𝑏17 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝑏18 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 
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Similarly, percentage marginal impact of July-August precipitation is greater and 
benefits corn yield in a wider range under low than average soil moisture condition. Also the 
marginal effect of July-August precipitation through reducing yield losses from high 
temperature is declining over time. The decrease is faster for higher temperature. Assume 
July-August temperature and July 1st soil moisture are taking their historical mean values. 
The relationship between log yield and July-August precipitation is becoming less concave 
over time. The marginal impact of July-August precipitation decreases over time when it is 
below average because 𝑏17 > 0 and the threshold below which increase in July-August 
precipitation benefits corn yield increases over time.  
 
Table 4.5: Marginal Effects Change Over Time since 1980 
Variables Values Marginal effects change over time. 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 
   Yield Log 
Yield 
Yield Log 
Yield 
Yield Log 
Yield 
 σ 0 0 Decrease Constant Constant Decrease Constant Constant 
 σ 0 -σ Decrease Constant Increase Decrease Constant Constant 
σ -σ 0 Decrease Constant Decrease Decrease Increase Constant 
σ -σ -σ Decrease Constant Constant Decrease Increase Constant 
Note: σ indicates one standard deviation above mean and similarly -σ is one standard 
deviation below mean. Other variables are taking historical mean values. 
Decrease/Increase/Constant means the marginal effects decrease/increase/unchanged over 
time. For July-August temperature, decrease in marginal effect means more yield losses. 
 
Since the marginal effects of weather variables rely on the value of each other. We 
summarize the change of the marginal effects over time under several hypothetical weather 
99 
 
conditions as shown in Table 4.5. And we focus on drought conditions which we have more 
concern. In general, yield losses from high July-August temperature increase over time in 
bushels per acre, but remain constant in terms of percentage. Marginal effect of July-August 
precipitation decreases under low precipitation level, but offsets by the increase through the 
substitution effect with soil moisture. In terms of percentage, the impact of July-August 
precipitation decreases. Marginal impact of July 1st soil moisture remains constant except 
that when July-August precipitation is low it increases due to the substitution effect. 
Total Weather Impact 
In previous section, we separately discuss the change in the impact of each weather 
variable over time, especially the impact of high July-August temperature, low July-August 
precipitation and July 1st soil moisture. This section we investigate the total impact of 
weather on corn yield and the change in the total weather impact over time. In the general 
expression, total weather impact on corn yield is simply 𝛽𝑤 ∗ 𝑓(𝑊𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽𝑤𝑇 ∗ 𝑓(𝑊𝑖,𝑡) ∗ 𝑇. 
The change in the total weather impact over time is 𝛽𝑤𝑇 ∗ 𝑓(𝑊𝑖,𝑡).  
For the Yield model, the change in the total weather impact over time is: 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑇
= 𝛽11 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝑀𝐽 + 𝛽12 ∗ (𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴)2 + 𝛽13 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴)2 
(4.6) 
 +𝛽14 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1  
This indicates that beside of the deterministic trend increase due to factors not related 
to weather variables, like technology and management, absolute trend yield might also 
change with weather variables like May-June temperature, July-August temperature and 
precipitation and July 1st soil moisture. 
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For the Log-Yield model, the change in the total weather impact in terms of 
percentage points over time is: 
𝜕100 ∗ log⁡(𝑌)
𝜕𝑇
= 𝑏14 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝑀𝐽 + 𝑏15 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 + 𝑏16 ∗ (𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴)2 
(4.7) 
 +𝑏17 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝
𝐽𝐴)2 + 𝑏18 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝
𝐽𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴  
For hypothetical weather conditions, we test the null hypotheses that yield deviation 
driven by weather variables remains constant over time. The result is illustrated in Table 4.6, 
in which Increase/Decrease/Constant indicates yield losses due to weather conditions 
increase/decrease/unchanged over time. 
 
Table 4.6: Total Weather Effects Change Over Time since 1980 
Variables Values Change in Yield Losses due to Weather 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐽𝐴 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑝𝐽𝐴 𝑆𝑀𝐽𝑢𝑙1 Yield Log Yield 
 σ 0 0 Increase Constant 
 σ 0 -σ Increase Constant 
σ -σ 0 Increase Decrease 
σ -σ -σ Increase Decrease 
2 σ -σ -σ Increase Constant 
Note: σ indicates one standard deviation above mean and similarly -σ is one standard 
deviation below mean. Other variables are taking historical mean values. 
Decrease/Increase/Constant means the marginal effects decrease/increase/unchanged over 
time.  
 
In general, yield losses from adverse weather impact increase over time in terms of 
bushels per acre. This is mainly due to increased yield losses from the dominant factor July-
August temperature. Expressed in percentage terms, we fail to reject that the marginal impact 
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remains constant over time under most cases. The impact of July-August temperature 
remains constant under moderate heat condition. So when July-August precipitation is below 
average, the less sensitivity of yield to precipitation becomes the dominant factor and yield 
losses decline under these conditions. But when July-August temperature is 2 times standard 
deviation above the historical mean, the total weather impact returns to be constant. The 
increased benefit from precipitation is offset by the damage from high heat. 
Moreover, the weather impact on trend is still well below the deterministic trend 
impact. Yield is still increasing over time. Although in absolute terms yield losses due to 
adverse weather increase over time, it remains about constant in percentage terms. 
Conclusions 
Weather plays an important role in predicting corn yield. Impacts of weather 
variables on corn yield have been well studied. The results are consistent that high 
temperature is the main factor for yield losses. Precipitation and soil moisture partially 
reduce the yield losses from high temperature. However, there are different opinions about 
whether corn yield is becoming more drought tolerant in absolute and percentage terms. We 
use a balanced panel dataset for 76 counties in Iowa and 76 counties in Illinois from 180 to 
2012. Two recent drought years 2011 and 2012 are included to have more observations of 
adverse weather conditions in the modern eras. Average temperature, average precipitation in 
July and August and soil moisture simulated from crop model EPIC on May 1
st
 and July 1
st
 
are adopted in our study. 
We construct the yield response function as the sum of a deterministic time trend 
variable and yield deviations due to weather variables which are composed of quadratic 
functions of all the weather variables and interaction of July-August temperature, 
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precipitation and July 1
st
 soil moisture, and the interaction of time trend with all the weather 
terms. This specification allows us to capture the interaction of temperature and water 
availability in the summer and also the change of weather impact over time. We test the 
hypotheses that the marginal and the total impact of weather variables remain constant over 
time under our hypothetical adverse weather conditions in both absolute and percentage 
terms. 
Our results suggest that yield sensitivity to adverse weather conditions increases over 
time since 1980 in bushels per acre. Yield losses increase over time primarily from high July-
August temperature. But in general we fail to reject the null hypothesis that corn yield 
sensitivity remains constant over time in terms of percentage. This might result from the 
increase in the absolute yield level due to technology or management improvement. And 
yield losses might have decreased under modest drought conditions.  
The marginal impact of July-August temperature decreases over time, which indicates 
that one degree increase in July-August temperature incurs more yield losses over time in 
bushels per acre. This change is not significant in terms of percentage. For July-August 
precipitation, the marginal impact increases over time when July 1
st
 soil moisture is low and 
increases faster for lower July 1
st
 soil moisture levels. This means the substitution effect is 
strengthening over time, especially when one source is limited and the other source is 
available. This is the same for July 1
st
 soil moisture. Other than the substitution effect, the 
marginal impacts of precipitation and soil moisture are about constant over time in terms of 
absolute yield. July-August precipitation marginal impact decreases over time in percentage 
terms because corn yield is becoming less sensitive to summer precipitation and precipitation 
is also becoming less helpful to reduce yield losses from high heat over time. Our model 
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estimates also show the marginal impact of July 1
st
 soil moisture on corn yield in percentage 
terms is not changing with time.  
To remove the possible bias in our model resulting from the weather trend, we also 
use the detrended weather variables to estimate our model. The major results are consistent 
with the model presented in this study.  
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CHAPTER 5.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
Due to the expansion of renewable fuel industry, agriculture and energy are closely 
correlated with each other. In the U.S., corn is the primary feedstock used to produce ethanol 
so that corn supply is critical to determine the biofuel production and energy policy 
effectiveness. Weather conditions play an important role in predicting corn yield. This 
dissertation is composed by three topics with different focuses on biofuel, and weather 
impacts on corn yields. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the biofuel market. We construct a computable trade model of 
ethanol related markets between the U.S. and Brazil. The supply curves of conventional 
biofuels RINs and advanced biofuels RINs are constructed, which can be used to illustrate 
and simulate the hierarchical competition of U.S. corn ethanol, Brazilian sugarcane ethanol 
and biodiesel, and to project all biofuels RINs prices. Moreover, we calibrate the demand and 
supply curves of corn, soybean, and biofuels, and simulate the equilibrium prices and 
quantities for marketing year 2013/14, using a stochastic partial equilibrium model. Results 
indicate that RFS mandates induce the two-way trade of ethanol across the U.S. and Brazil 
and the possibility of two-way trade would increase with the other advanced mandate. 
Biodiesel helps reduce this potentially trade, but could not eliminate this whole impact on 
trade without subsidies. 
In chapter 2, we calibrate corn yield by fitting a beta distribution from historical data. 
Chapter 3 shifts to investigate the weather and soil moisture impact on corn yield, which is 
critical to predict corn yield. Not limited to use the two frequently used weather variables, 
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temperature and precipitation; we add soil moisture as an explanatory variable into the corn 
yield response function. Daily soil moisture data in the Upper Mississippi River Basin Area 
from 1980 to 2012 is simulated from the crop model EPIC. Recent two drought years 2011 
and 2012 are included in the estimation dataset to facilitate estimation of corn yield response 
to extreme conditions. We develop a fixed effect model with sum of linear spline function of 
weather variables and interactions of July-August variables. Bayesian Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo approach is applied to estimate the parameters and the thresholds simultaneously. 
Results suggest corn yield effects from high temperature and plant water availability cannot 
be meaning fully isolated from one another. The percent yield reduction from high 
temperature is 15 to 20 percentage points greater under low compared to high water 
availability. The determinant factors for corn yield losses vary across the Corn Belt region. 
Excessive spring rainfall is damaging to corn yield in Illinois and Iowa, however, during hot 
and dry summers, excessive spring rainfall is important for reducing yield loss through the 
soil moisture effect. In Wisconsin, too little spring rainfall is more damaging than too much. 
In chapter 4, we focus on the topic that whether corn yield losses driven by weather 
conditions have reduced over time. With more observations under drought condition in 2011 
and 2012, we revisit previous literature and find that corn yield losses from drought increase 
in bushels and remain constant rather than decreasing in percentage terms. We then develop 
yield response functions to allow the weather impact on corn yield to change over time and 
test the hypotheses that the impacts remain constant over time under our hypothetical adverse 
weather conditions. Our results show that yield losses due to drought conditions increases 
over time in absolute yield terms but remains constant in percentage terms due to increase in 
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base yield over time. Corn yield is becoming less sensitive to July-August precipitation 
which reduces yield losses under modest drought level.  
 
 
